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ABSTRACT 
Studies of major blackouts reveal that power system protection devices have 
contributed to a majority of system disturbances. This leads to efforts of improving 
protection philosophy. 
Analysis shows that conventional protection relies on coordination among stand­
alone relays to obtain a dependability-biased component-protection scheme. Whereas it is 
more desirable and also feasible nowadays for an integrated approach to both component and 
system protection, provided modern relays possessing the ability of sharing information and 
applying intelligence in decision-making. 
This dissertation proposes the adaptive protection concept for wide area systems. The 
scope of the research includes identifying and developing the desired architecture, intelligent 
algorithms and communication needs that facilitate the protection system to avoid and reduce 
the impact of system emergencies. 
The purpose of this research work is to conceptualize and nurture adaptive protection 
concept for wide area systems, and to conduct feasibility studies to make this concept 
practically viable. Several case studies are conducted to show the effectiveness of the 
proposed adaptive protection scheme. In addition, voltage stability, which is a classic wide 
area problem, can be alleviated with the proposed concept. Steady state and transient 
simulation studies provided encouraging results. The detailed decision-making algorithms are 
simulated in several examples for validation of the concept. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The need to improve protection philosophy emerged with recent post-mortem studies 
of major blackouts. It was found that power system protection devices have contributed to a 
majority of system disturbances. False and undesired operations of these devices play an 
important role in initiating and propagating cascading events (Phadke, Horowitz, & Thorp, 
1999; Taylor, 1999; Taylor & Erickson, 1997). A CIGRÉ study found that 27% of bulk 
power system disturbances resulted from false trips of tie protection system (1995). An 
analysis of 17-year data provided in the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) 
reports (1995) revealed that 63% of major disturbances are protection-related. 
A part of the responsibility for these problems lies in the nature and history of 
protection designs. Classical or component protection systems currently in vogue rely on 
individual relays to initiate switching actions to rapidly and reliably isolate a faulted portion 
of a local sub-system. This protection philosophy was formed more than 70 years ago (Sidhu 
et al., 2002). These systems were conceived to assure the "dependability" of fault isolation at 
the expense of false trips. The primary intent of this philosophy is to minimize damage to 
system components and is appropriate when a system is in a normal operating state. 
However, if a system is under stress, for example, due to outages or excessive loading, 
additional switching to isolate faults will cause further stress that may contribute to 
widespread system failures. If the switching is due to a false trip, or an undesired trip, then 
the protection system contributes to system failures. That is, system "security" is 
compromised. 
A major advance in protection development was the introduction of System 
Protection Schemes (SPS) to expand the protection philosophy from a component level to a 
system level. SPS was intended to preserve the security of the system under specific 
conditions such as loss of synchronism from generators (Begovic et al., 2001). Functionally 
SPS makes use of signals from both system control and protection systems to assure "secure" 
system operation. However, based on the industry experience, SPS itself introduces 
unnecessary operations (Anderson & LeReverend, 1996). Furthermore, installing SPS as an 
additional layer of a dedicated scheme at the base of existing protection system could lead to 
complex coordination problems. This in turn could lead to conflicting protection decisions. 
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Therefore, SPS may not be best suited to close the gap between system protection and 
component protection. 
An additional difficulty for proper protection is that a problem in the protection 
system can remain undetected under normal conditions. Such a "hidden failure" has been 
defined as "a defect such as a component failure, inappropriate setting or incorrect external 
connection that remains undetected until some other system event causes the hidden failure 
to initiate a cascading outage" (Phadke, Horowitz, & Thorp, 1995). A frequently cited 
example of a hidden failure is a failed fault detector or communication link in a directional 
comparison-blocking scheme that causes a relay to open a breaker inappropriately in the 
event of a fault on the adjacent line. Following a fault in a stressed power system, quite 
frequently hidden failures in protection systems would cause additional false trips. This 
tripping of additional facilities may start a chain reaction, evolving to catastrophic failures. 
Recent research work quantified the influence of hidden failures and supervising protection 
systems (Phadke, 2002). Among all suggested countermeasures, improving protection design 
to reduce the impact of hidden failures is of the greatest interest (Phadke, 2002). 
Deregulation of electric utilities is another motivating factor to examine the current 
protection philosophy. Organizational restructuring of power systems calls for integration of 
conflicting protection requirements of competing entities, e.g. system operators, transmission 
system owners, and power producers. Thus, protection schemes originally designed for a 
vertically integrated system may not be appropriate for electric companies operating under 
deregulated environment (Phadke et al., 1999). 
As power systems become more closely linked and heavily stressed, protecting them 
from both sustained faults and abnormal events requires an integrated approach to protection 
system design (Horowitz & Phadke, 1992). There is no doubt of the superiority of 
microprocessor relays over its analogue alternatives. They possess major advantages such as 
accurate extraction of the fundamental voltage and current components through filtering, 
functional benefits resulting from multi-processor design and extensive self-monitoring, etc. 
(Aggarwal & Johns, 1997). However, all these factors have not led to a major leap in speed, 
sensitivity and selectivity of the entire protection system. This is so because digital relays so 
far are simply replicates of their antecedents, or at the most, combination of several function 
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modules. Evaluating conventional relays, two constraints during the age when they were 
developed are noticed. Firstly, information was not shared among relays so each relay was 
using only a fraction of all information available. Secondly, the ability of each relay to 
process large amount of data was limited, by both the computation speed and the algorithms. 
To combat the existing problems in various relay operation and meet the emerging 
power grids requirements, protection engineers have a considerable arsenal of new 
capabilities. New sensors, especially phasor measurement units (PMUs), provide 
fundamentally new functionalities (Denys, Counan, Hossenlopp, & Holweck, 1992). Utilities 
are busy installing new, high bandwidth communications systems for both business and 
operations, systems that also provide new capability for protection (Taylor, 2000). High­
speed computation facilities provide the needed impetus. And computer-based relays provide 
the desired new logic for complex decision-making (Phadke & Thorp, 1993). Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) approaches are introduced for integrating extensive, redundant but 
imprecise data into intelligent decisions (Aggarwal & Johns, 1997). With the availability of 
these rapidly developing technologies, it is possible to gather critical and extensive 
information in real-time. This in turn will aid in assessing system vulnerability as quickly as 
possible. At the same time, improvements of power system equipment lead to an increase in 
operation limits (Wan, McCalley, & Vittal, 1999; Lachs, 2001). Increased transmission and 
generation capacity enables more flexibility in protection design and settings. In order for 
power grids of tomorrow to withstand catastrophes, it is highly desirable for the protection 
system to be adaptive based on system-wide considerations. An overall adaptive wide area 
protection design with both inherent dependability and security is now feasible. The 
performance of digital relays is to be substantially improved if new infrastructure and 
intelligent approaches fitting the technology available is adopted. 
The purpose of this research work is to conceptualize and nurture adaptive protection 
concept for wide area systems, and to conduct feasibility studies to make this concept 
practically viable. The scope includes identifying and developing the desired architecture, 
algorithms and communication needs that facilitate the protection system to avoid and reduce 
the impact of system emergencies. The goal is to achieve a balance between dependability 
and security of the protection even under the occurrence of hidden failures in real time. 
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Several case studies are conducted to show the effectiveness of the proposed adaptive 
protection scheme. In addition, voltage stability, which is a classic wide area problem, can be 
alleviated with the proposed concept. Steady state and transient simulation studies provided 
encouraging results. The detailed decision-making algorithms are simulated in several 
examples for validation of the concept. Finally, the main contributions of this research work 
are identified. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Two parts of work were conducted in reviewing the literature related to adaptive wide 
area protection and emergency control. One focused on the concept and development of 
adaptive protection. The second effort was to develop an annotated bibliography. 
2.1 Adaptive Protection 
The concept of "adaptive protection" has become commonly associated with many 
different proposals. For example, a relay system might adjust its bias to solve the problem in 
protection system design of skewing toward dependability rather than security. With 
computer relays connected to a communication system, one can imagine the bias being 
shifted toward secure operation during system stress due to component outages, impending 
storms, or heavy loading. Such a shift may be accomplished by adjusting the relay settings to 
alter the reach of relays. One can also adjust time delays or rely on backup relays. The 
system could then return to dependable operation when the period of stress has passed. 
As a partial test of this concept, it has been shown that rapid calculation of new relay 
settings to maintain coordination in the event of system changes is possible. Jampala, 
Venkata and Damborg (1989) demonstrated the complete coordination of overcurrent relay 
settings for a 38-bus, 61-line system in 6 seconds using the supercomputers of 1988. While 
this is a small system, it was also shown that the relays that must be reset to maintain 
coordination in the event of topological changes are restricted to the neighborhood of the 
change (Ramaswami, Damborg, & Venkata, 1990). That is, in at least some cases, the extent 
of the required adaptation is limited. 
Various definitions of adaptive protection have been used in the literature. Jampala et 
al. (1989, p.178) referred to "the ability of the protection system to automatically alter its 
operating parameters in response to changing network conditions to maintain optimal 
performance. " The IEEE Power System Relaying Committee (PSRC) gave its definition 
(1993, p.975) of an adaptive function as one that "automatically adjusts the operating 
characteristics of the relay system in response the changing power system conditions. " A 
more general definition (Horowitz, Phadke, & Thorp, 1988, p. 1436) of adaptive protection is 
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given as " a protection philosophy which permits and seeks to make adjustment to various 
protection functions in order to make them more attuned to prevailing power system 
conditions. " 
Except for slight differences, all definitions suggest: 
• Automatically altering, on-line, the protection system settings, functions and 
characteristics. This suggestion implies the need for computing and transmitting 
new operating parameters from a central site. Digital relays make on-line changes 
possible. An expanded communications system is required for realization. 
• Finding optimal, condition dependent relay settings, i.e. settings that will result in 
the most desirable operation instead of a conventional trade-off between 
conflicting requirements, such as dependability and security, or for different load 
conditions. 
A survey of adaptive protection literature between 1988 and 2002 is summarized in 
Table 2.1. Most striking here is the progression from basic concepts to those of wide area 
protection and control. 
Table 2.1 Developments of adaptive protection concepts, 1988-2002 
Time period Summary of contributions 
1988-1990 
Basic concepts of adaptive protection 
Rapid coordination calculation experiments 
Subsystem and localization studies 
1991-1993 
Digital relaying systems 
Specific adaptive relaying examples 
Use of synchronized phasor measurements 
Surveys of industrial practice and wishes 
1994-1996 
Identify relays as major blackouts contributors 
Special purpose adaptive applications 
Identify concept of hidden failures 
Discussion of on-line coordination 
1997-1999 
Additional applications: auto reclosure, transformer protection 
Additional techniques: agents, decision trees 
Experiments with wide area concepts 
2000-2002 
Classify mechanism of hidden failures 
Experiments with new strategies in regional back-up protection 
Recent studies of wide area control measures for avoiding or minimizing the impact 
of system disruptions have made liberal use of protection components. Hence, they should be 
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considered, at least in part, as extensions of the protection system. Most of them rely on 
switching action as a result of decisions based on measurements collected over a wide 
geographical area and the response depends on the system operating state. These are clear 
examples of adaptive protection. The studies reviewed in this section will serve to illustrate 
the point. 
Two related papers by EPRI (1997) and Rovnyak, Taylor, and Thorp (1997) studied 
the ability to use phasor measurements distributed over the Western Electricity Coordinating 
Council (WECC, the previous WSCC) system to control otherwise unstable disturbances. 
The EPRI report (1997) examined preferred locations for the Phasor Measurement Units 
(PMU) as well as the communication networks necessary to collect the system phasor 
measurements at a central site. The study also investigated the stabilizing ability of rapid 
changes in HVDC transmission for selected contingencies on the WECC system, a control 
that may be possible as a result of the phasor measurements. Rovnyak et al. (1997) expanded 
the arsenal of controls and explored decision trees as a mechanism for making the control 
decisions that would be required to dispatch such control signals. It was found that, using a 
176-bus model of the WECC system, an instability patterned on a 14 December 1994 
disturbance could have been stabilized through a combination of generator tripping, HVDC 
flow adjustment, and load shedding distributed throughout the WECC system. In particular, 
the load shedding actions occurred at 16 buses distributed from the Pacific Northwest to 
Southern California. Of significance to protection system design is the breaker action due to 
load shedding and, perhaps, generator tripping. Since these actions were initiated 0.1 second 
(100 ms) after the event, the demands on the communication and control system were 
significant. 
Researchers at Hydro-Quebec studied persistently troublesome instabilities on their 
system, ones that were uncontrollable with local controls alone (Kamwa, Grondin, Asber, 
Gingras, & Trudel, 1999). They found from simulation studies that the system could be 
stabilized with load modulation using signals derived from a mix of local information and 
global, i.e. phasor measurements at remote locations. The sensitivity of load-modulation-
controller performance to communication time delays was examined and found to be an 
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important issue. Depending on the controller design, otherwise stable transients would 
become unstable if signal delays were as small as 250 ms. 
Finally, Electricite de France (Faucon & Dousset, 1997; Houry & Faucon, 1999) 
reported on studies conducted for a "defense plan" in Southern France in the event of 
instabilities. If an out-of-step condition is detected, the plan is to isolate appropriate regions 
and adjust the balance of generation and loads in each island to sustain stable operation. The 
scheme involves detecting the instability at a central site using phasor measurements and 
sending trip signals to lines to accomplish the area isolation, and to loads to balance with the 
area generation. Their studies indicated that control action must be initiated within 1.3 
seconds and they estimated that it could be accomplished in 1.07 seconds. The satellite 
communication system consumed 690 ms of this interval for wide area communications. 
It can be observed from these studies that rapid switching actions, including adaptive 
islanding, load shedding and generator tripping, are beneficial in maintaining synchronism in 
unstable situations. Such use of the protection system over a wide area places very 
demanding requirements on the communication and control system. Faucon and Dousset 
(1997) analyzed these requirements and suggested they could be accomplished within the 1.3 
seconds required. Other cases examined were more demanding requiring control action in as 
short an interval as 0.1 second. In a later chapter the time required for gathering data, making 
decisions and effecting control over a wide area is studied. It is estimated to be less than 200 
ms using modern communication technology. 
2.2 Bibliography on Adaptive Wide Area Relaying 
An annotated bibliography was developed in this research. It covers various topics 
related to adaptive wide area relaying in the last 14 years and contains 81 entries. In this 
section the different categories of topics are listed for better understanding of the research 
work. 
2.2.1 Advances in Protection 
Local and regional protection techniques development is the most direct category that 
this research is involved. On one hand the rich resource of protection principle, algorithm and 
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practice advances provide the arsenal for detailed relay design improvement. On the other 
hand the topics in this category are confined by traditional protection philosophy. 
• Local protection 
o Component protection 
o Automatic coordination 
o Adaptive autoreclosure 
• SPS 
2.2.2 Wide Area Protection & Hidden Failures 
As new problems were found and as new needs emerged, new concepts were 
discussed in this category. So far the study of wide area protection and hidden failures is at 
the conceptual stage in the sense that no details, such as wide area protection architecture, 
system requirements considering the existence of hidden failures, or practical models and 
study approaches of hidden failures were proposed. Nevertheless, the discussion broadened 
the sight of protection engineers and intrigued more research interest. 
2.2.3 Relevant New Techniques 
These are new techniques in areas other than protection itself. They are, however, 
appealing for possible adoption in future relaying systems. 
• Measurements 
o Sensors 
o Measuring algorithms 
• Countermeasures in control 
• Communications 
2.2.4 Artificial Intelligence Applications 
The brief introduction of Artificial Intelligence and its application in power system 
and protection are provided for the purpose of comparing existing AI approaches. The 
feasibility of applying various AI techniques to adaptive wide area protection algorithms was 
probed. 
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2.2.5 System Study 
Profound understanding of system behavior with current protection is gained through 
post-mortem study of wide area disturbances conducted by other researchers. 
• Voltage stability study 
• Angular stability study 
The annotated bibliography, along with a broad literature review, provides the 
researcher a solid base for adaptive wide area protection study and design. 
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CHAPTER 3. ADAPTIVE WIDE AREA PROTECTION 
DESIGN 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to discuss various facets of adaptive wide area 
protection systems in order to generate thought-provoking ideas from protection engineers. 
The block diagram shown in Fig. 3.1 is to provide a quick overview of the proposed concept. 
From this diagram one can discern that there are many issues that need to be considered and 
implemented. In Section 3.1, two operating modes of adaptive protection are first defined. 
The relative issues on risk of security versus dependability for protection schemes are 
presented in Section 3.2. By analyzing the nature of the protection system, a new paradigm to 
view the overall protection architecture is offered and consequently the limitations of current 
protection systems are exposed in Section 3.3. The main contributions of SPS in combating 
problems of traditional component protection are introduced in Section 3.4. At the same time, 
it is also pointed out that SPS has its own limitations in meeting the needs of wide area 
protection systems. These observations motivated the author to propose new adaptive 
protection architecture for wide area power system protection. The hardware and logical 
details of this new and revolutionary architecture are proposed in Section 3.5. To realize the 
proposed architecture, decision-making algorithms for adaptive relaying are examined in 
detail in Section 3.6. Finally both single-phase and three-phase adaptive reclosure are briefly 
probed in Section 3.7 to complete the adaptive wide area protection design. 
Real-time 
vulnerability 
indices 
Synchronized 
wide-area signals 
Decision-Making algorithms 
within each relay 
Architecture 
Legend 
Data flow in communications 
Control action signals 
Figure 3.1 Conceptual block diagram of adaptive wide area protection 
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3.1 Two Forms of Adaptive Protection: Preventive and 
Emergency 
Two different operating modes under which the protection system is required to 
respond are identified for the purpose of adaptive protection design. One mode anticipates 
vulnerabilities and positions the system to be more robust in the event of a threat. This first 
mode is called Preventive Adaptive Protection in which the protection system's 
characteristics are altered when the system is under stress. For example, the relay might 
adjust parameters by itself during heavy loading to guard against the impact of hidden 
failures. These changes are made before any fault but with the intent that, should such an 
event occur, the possibility and impact of any unnecessary operation of protection devices on 
the system would be minimal. 
Another mode is Emergency Adaptive Protection in which the protection system 
reacts to an emergency by taking additional actions to restrict the impact of a relay 
unnecessary operation. For example, if a fault occurs and a hidden failure results in 
unnecessary line outages, a system-wide instability could occur. However, if corrective 
action were taken quickly and adaptively, a large outage may be avoided. This more 
ambitious response mode might identify a developing emergency and respond to diminish its 
impact, e.g. create islands with balanced generation and load in the event of a transient or 
dynamic instability. 
Under the Preventive Adaptive Protection mode, there is adequate time for 
conducting off- line stability and risk analysis of the entire system. Therefore proper control 
measures are chosen to preserve the system security. In contrast, Emergency Adaptive 
Protection has a more critical œsponse time requirement so the design of its architecture, 
algorithms and communications all need thorough assessment before being adopted. In this 
research more effort is devoted to the design of Emergency Adaptive Protection. These two 
operational modes are examined and discussed in detail in Chapter 5 based on the simulation 
of six cases via the proposed approach on a 179-bus equivalent test system. 
13 
3.2 Risk of Security versus Dependability for Power System 
Protection 
It is observed that the prohibitive cost of wide area blackouts requires a philosophical 
shift from conventional "component protection" to "system protection", and from 
"dependability" to "security" of relay operation when a system is under stress (Phadke et al., 
1999). In this section the balance of security versus dependability for power system 
protection is discussed to examine the intuitive observation stated above. 
The reliability of a protection system has two aspects: dependability and security. 
Being "dependable" requires the protection system to operate correctly for all the faults for 
which it is designed to operate. If it fails to operate successfully when required then its 
dependability is lost. Being "secure" requires the protection system to operate only when it is 
intended to do so. Unnecessary or false tripping of any relay is identified as the loss of 
security. 
A relay design can achieve the balance between dependability and security, for 
example, by tuning the relay sensitivity. Higher sensitivity usually leads to the tendency of 
relay false tripping due to the inevitable noise in the measurements. On the other hand, lower 
relay sensitivity may result in slow action or even possible failure to trip. In real life the 
design and configuration of protection schemes can be complicated and random failures of 
the relay parts may affect the relay behavior unexpectedly, thus the relationship between 
dependability and security may be very complex and difficult to study. In general, enhancing 
one measure would mean decreasing the other (Blackburn, 1998). 
Traditionally the probability of protection systems "false tripping" is higher than that 
of their "failure to trip". This situation is acceptable for a grid with many alternative paths for 
power to flow from generators to loads. Intuitively it is reasonable because with multiple 
redundancies in the system, the loss of a component, say a transmission line, would not have 
severe impact on the system integrity and no customers are affected. However, when the 
system is critically loaded, or if it is experiencing contingencies, the relays can not afford to 
falsely trip and the philosophy of leaning to dependability is no longer appropriate (Horowitz 
& Phadke, 1992). 
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To decide the relay reliability bias between dependability and security, it is necessary 
to compare the impact of "false tripping" with that of "failure to trip". In the real world 
"failure to trip" of a primary relay usually ends up with isolation of the fault by backup 
relays. If it is a local backup, the impact is likely to be minimal. On the other hand if it is a 
remote backup then it will de-energize a larger portion of the system and therefore poses 
more threats to the system integrity. There are other factors that could also adjust the impact 
of a relay operation significantly, such as hidden failures and the social cost of blackouts. 
Therefore the decision on the balance of dependability versus security is a complex issue 
needing a careful examination and introspection In the following examples, the author 
attempts to provide a simple risk analysis of protection systems operation to demonstrate that 
the balance between dependability and security varies as the system operating status changes. 
Firstly the composite risk of the protection system unreliability is defined and then each term 
is analyzed numerically. 
Let A be the event of a relay tripping successfully. 
B be the complement of A. 
F denote a fault on a protected component, or referred to as the environment with 
hazard. 
NF denote the complement of F. 
Therefore A n NF denotes the unconditional event of "relay false tripping" (the same 
as a mis-operation or an unnecessary operation). 
Similarly B n F denotes the unconditional event of relay "failure to trip". 
R (A n NF) denotes the risk of relay false tripping. 
R (B n F) denotes the risk of relay failure to trip. 
P (A n NF) denotes the probability of relay false tripping. 
P (B n F) denotes the probability of relay failure to trip. 
C (A n NF) denotes the cost of relay false tripping. 
C (B n F) denotes the cost of relay failure to trip. 
Events A and B are assumed to be mutually exclusive, therefore dependent1. 
1 Although Anderson (1999, p. 1009) discussed the case of "events that are independent and disjoint (the same 
term as mutually exclusive)" , it is almost meaningless unless at least one of the two events is an empty set. This 
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The composite risk R from the two modes of relay failure, namely, false tripping and 
failure to trip is given by: 
R = R (A n NF) + R (B n F) 
= C (A n NF) * P (A n NF) + C (B n F) * P (B n F) (3.1) 
3.2.1 Risk versus Cost Analysis 
Equation (3.1) forms the basis for risk analysis. It can be observed from this equation 
that the overall risk of a protective operation to the system has contributions from both 
probability of each unreliable mode and its corresponding cost to the system. The following 
examples provide a very basic and simplified analysis on the "risk versus cost" facet and the 
risk analysis from the probability point of view is discussed in Subsection 3.2.2. The 
examples are intended to illustrate the instinctive observations instead of systematically 
analyzing the risk of protection systems, which is beyond the scope of this research 
3.2.1.1 Example 1: protection of a single component 
In this example two typical schemes of a two-relay protection system that protects a 
single component such as a generator or a transmission line, are compared. The first one 
considers a series layout which requires two-out-of-two for the successful protective 
operation and the second one applies a parallel logic requiring one-out-of-two for the 
successful protective operation. 
Relay2 
Relayl 
Relayl Relayl 
Series scheme 
Parallel scheme 
Figure 3.2 Two typical schemes of a two-relay protection system 
is because non-empty mutually exclusive events are dependent. The reasoning of this statement is briefly listed 
as below: 
For mutually exclusive events El and E2, P (El n E2) = 0; 
For independent events El and E2, P (El n E2) = P (El) * P (E2); 
For non-empty events El and E2, P (El) ? 0 and P (E2) ? 0, so P (El) * P (E2) ? 0. 
Therefore non-empty events A and B cannot be both independent and mutually exclusive. This conclusion is 
straightforward to understand since being mutually exclusive means that both events cannot occur 
simultaneously. In other words, if one event happens the other can not happen. This way the occurrence of one 
event has a great effect on the occurrence probability of the other. Thus the events are dependent. 
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The series scheme is more secure but less dependable than the parallel one. 
Extending the notations in equation (3.1), define: 
Asenes and EWies as the events of tripping and not tripping, respectively, of the series 
protection scheme; 
Aparaiiei and parallel as the events of tripping and not tripping, respectively, of the 
parallel protection scheme; 
ai and b, as the events of tripping and not tripping, respectively, of relay 1 ; 
a2 and \>2 as the events of tripping and not tripping, respectively, of relay 2; 
P (a; | NF) and P (b; | F) as conditional probabilities of "relay i false tripping" and 
"relay i failure to trip", respectively, where i = 1, 2; 
C (A n NF) as the cost to the grid due to the protection scheme false tripping, 
assuming that the protection scheme internal layout makes no difference on the protection 
failure cost to the grid, or C (Aseries n NF) = C (Aparaiiei n NF) = C (A n NF); 
C (B n F) as the cost to the grid due to the protection scheme failure to trip, similarly 
assuming C (Bseries n F) = C (Bparaiiei n F) = C (B n F). 
The composite risk of the two protection schemes can be expressed as: 
Rseries = C (A n NF) * P (A^ies n NF) + C (B n F) * P (Bseries n F) 
= C (A n NF) * {P (a, | NF) * P (a2 | NF) * [1 - P (F)]} + C (B n F) * {[P (b, | F) + P 
(b2 | F) - P (bi | F) * P (b2 | F)] * P (F)} (3.2) 
Rparallel = C (A n NF) * P (Aparaiiei n NF) +C (B n F) * P (Bparalie| n F) 
= C (A n NF) *{[P (a, | NF) + P (a2 | NF) - P (a, | NF) * P (a2 | NF)] * [1 - P (F)]} + 
C (B n F) * [P (b, | F) * P (b2 | F) * P'(F)] (3.3) 
To simplify the case, the two relays are assumed to be identical. It is assumed that for 
each relay, the conditional probabilities of "relay false tripping" and "relay failure to trip" 
remain constant under different power system stress level (Anderson, 1999). Using the same 
data as Anderson (1999) did, P (ai | NF) = P (a2 | NF) = 0.05, P (b| J F) = P (b2 | F) = 0.025 
and P (F) = 10~4, equations (3.2) and (3.3) yield: 
Rseries = 2.5 * 10"3 * C (A n NF) + 5 * 10'6 * C (B n F) 
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Rparaiiei = 9.7 * 10'2 * C (A n NF) + 6.3 * 10'8 * C (B n F) 
Obviously, the values of C (A n NF) and C (B n F) will determine the better scheme 
in term of minimal composite system. 
• When C (A n NF) < 5.2 * 10"5 * C (B n F), R^ries > Rparaiiei, which means the 
secure series logic scheme has a higher overall risk2; 
• When C (A n NF) > 5.2 * 10"5 * C (B n F), Rseries < Rparaiiei, which means the 
same pro-security series scheme has a lower overall risk than the dependable 
parallel one. 
To compare the risk of these two protection schemes, real costs of protection failures 
to the grid need to be explored further. Anderson (1999) claims that C (A n NF) « C (B n 
F). He argued that for a synchronous generator, the cost of an adverse tripping of a relay 
could be thousands of dollars. It is for the purchase of replacement energy at a higher cost. 
While the permanent damage to the generator could even mean millions of dollars if the relay 
fails to protect it. This assumption is true £>r lightly loaded to normal conditions due to the 
fact that there is always spinning reserve from other generators so adverse tripping of a 
generator is not catastrophic to the power grid. However, if the grid is already highly stressed 
to the extent of being (N-l) insecure, losing one more generator may lead to loss of 
synchronism, system islanding and extensive blackout, resulting in catastrophic conditions. 
In such a case, C (A n NF) could also reach millions of dollars or even more. Consequently 
the cost of "relay false tripping" would become comparable to that of "relay failure to trip" 
for stressed power grids. Thus the more secure relay scheme would have lower overall risk 
and becomes more preferable. 
We point out that the results of this example are driven largely by the extreme events, 
specifically the extreme undependable failure mode, i.e., the two-relay failure to trip and the 
extreme insecure failure mode, i.e., the two-relay false tripping. An important assumption 
2 In general, when comparing any two protection schemes SI and S2, when C (A n NF) * [P (As, n NF) - P 
(As2 n NF)] < C (B n F ) * [P (B$2 n F) - P (Bsl n F)], where the subscripts of SI and S2 indicate these two 
schemes, R si < Rs2, suggesting scheme SI is better than scheme S2 in the sense of overall risk of relay failure. 
18 
underlying this example is that the extreme undependable failure mode is constant with 
system stress, but the consequence of the extreme insecure failure mode changes 
significantly with system stress. Specifically, the consequence of the extreme undependable 
failure mode is given as 2C(G)+C(N-2); for the unstressed case, this is 1,000,020, and for the 
stressed case, 1,002,000. In terms of order of magnitude, this is effectively no change. In 
contrast, the consequence of the extreme insecure failure mode is given as C(N-2); for the 
unstressed case, this is 20, and for the stressed case, 2000, a difference of 2 orders of 
magnitude. As a result (given that probabilities are constant with increasing stress), we see 
• virtually no change in risk of the extreme undependable failure mode 
(0.487583001 to 0.488065703) 
• a change in risk of the extreme insecure failure mode of 2 orders of magnitude 
(0.190106 to 19.03029) 
Reasoning for the above stated assumption is based on a perception that 
• the extreme insecure failure would result in possible load interruption, whereas 
the cost of load interruption certainly varies with the load level drastically, and 
that 
• the consequence of the undependable failure mode changes less drastically with 
system stress because the extreme undependable relay failure would cause 
equipment damage due to the presence of the high fault currents, plus the load 
interruption 
When the cost of equipment which is considered constant is usually much larger than 
that of a load interruption, the overall cost of relay undependable failure varies insignificantly 
with system load level. 
This simple example shows that the protection reliability bias between dependability 
and security of different relay schemes under different operational conditions can be 
analyzed by the probability and cost of different modes of protection failure. This analytical 
approach may be generalized to a large power system, although the procedure could be 
complex and challenging. Normally the operation condition of a grid is required to be (N-l) 
secure, as the stress going up, the grid becomes less secure. There is a certain point at which 
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the grid becomes (N-l) insecure. It is therefore desirable to identify the grid stress level and 
to adjust the protection system behavior accordingly. 
Based on the result of this simple example, one might conclude that, for highly 
stressed power grids, we should bias protection systems more towards security than for 
lightly loaded systems needing higher dependability. This might be the case, but before 
reaching a strong conclusion to this effect, it is necessary to examine at least two additional 
questions. 
• To what extent should protection bias be driven only by the extreme events? 
• To what extent do failure probabilities vary with system stress? 
We believe that our above analysis provides an excellent springboard for 
investigating these additional questions. 
3.2.1.2 Example 2: protection of two components 
In this example, the same risk analysis approach as in previous subsection is applied 
to compare different schemes for the protection of two components. Two sets of two-relay 
protection schemes same as those in the previous example are installed to protect two 
components, such as generators or transmission lines. The two sets of protection schemes are 
either both series layout to create a pro-security scheme or both parallel as a pro-
dependability setting. 
When the protected components are electrically far away from each other, neither 
protection scheme is able to see the fault occurring nearby the other component. The 
operation of each protection scheme depends only on the prevailing condition of the 
neighborhood of its own protected component and the relays characteristics. That is, the 
behavior of the two sets of protection schemes is assumed to be independent. Tables 3.1 
through 3.3 show the calculation of probability and risk in this independent case. Table 3.1 
provides the probability data and formulas used for the calculation that follows. The 
following data used are again borrowed from Anderson (1999): 
a, representing protection conditional false tripping probability; 
b, representing protection conditional failure to trip probability; 
p, representing power grid fault rate. 
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Tables 3.2 and 3.3 calculate the risks of the pro-security scheme and the pro-
dependability scheme under different grid conditions. In an (N-2) secure grid the cost of (N-
2) contingency is relatively low (assumed to be $0 in Table 3.2) comparing to the cost of 
damaging the facility (assumed to be $1,000,000 in Table 3.2). Therefore the overall risk of 
all 12 unreliable modes of the more secure protection scheme (9.88 in Table 3.2) is higher 
than that of the pro-dependability scheme (0.125 in Table 3.2). Whereas when the grid is (N-
2) insecure the cost of (N-2) contingency can be quite high (assumed to be $10,000 in Table 
3.3), leading to a different comparison of the risks of the two protection schemes3 : pro-
security scheme 9.94 and pro-dependability scheme 95.4 in Table 3.3. The conclusion from 
this example is similar to that from Example 1 — highly stressed power grids would need the 
protection system biased more towards security than lightly loaded systems towards 
dependability. 
Table 3.1 Probabilities of relay operations 
Probability 
formulas one relay 
series scheme (of two 
relays) 
parallel scheme (of 
two relays) 
Protection conditional false 
tripping a 0.05 0.05*0.05=0.0025 
0.05+0.05-
0.05*0.05=0.0975 
Protection conditional failure 
to trip b 0.025 
0.025+0.025-
0.025*0.025=0.049375 0.025*0.025=0.000625 
Protected component fault rate P 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Protection unconditional false 
tripping a*(l-p) 0.049995 0.00249975 0.09749025 
Protection unconditional 
failure to trip b * p 0.0000025 4.9375E-06 6.25E-08 
Protection normal d-a) + (l-p) 0.949905 0.99740025 0.90240975 
Protection correct tripping (l-b)'p 0.0000975 9.50625E-05 9.99375E-05 
Table 3.2 Risk of protection operations with the grid (N-2) secure 
formulas 
2 series 
schemes: 
secure 
2 parallel 
schemes: 
dependable 
assumed cost of (N-2) contingency ($) C(N-2) 0 0 
assumed cost of damaging the equipment 
($) C(G) 1.00E+06 1.00E+06 
risk of 2 schemes false tripping C(N-2)*a*(l-p)*a*(l-p) 0 0 
3 The cost to the system of a contingency varies greatly with many factors such as different types of 
contingency and system operating conditions. In this case, assuming the cost of (N-l) contingency is zero, the 
threshold cost of (N-2) contingency is $1,024. That is, as long as the cost is below $1,024, the risk of the pro-
security scheme is higher than that of the pro -dependability one. If the cost of (N-l) contingency is actually 
larger than zero, the threshold cost of (N-2) contingency is even smaller. 
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risk of 1 scheme false tripping, 1 correct 
tripping, (2 cases) 2*C(N-2)*a*(l -p)*(l-b)*p 0 0 
risk of 1 scheme false tripping, 1 failure 
to trip, (2 cases) 
2*[C(N-2)+C(G)]*a* (1-
p)*b*p 0.024685031 0.012186281 
risk of 1 scheme correct tripping, 1 
failure to trip, (2 cases) 
2*[C(N-2)+C(G)]*b*p*(l-b) 
*p 0.000938742 1.24922E-05 
risk of 2 schemes failure to trip [2*C(G)+C(N-2)]*b*p*b*p 4.87578E-05 7.8125E-09 
(N-2) eases overall risk sum 0.025672531 0.012198781 
assumed cost of (N-l)contingency(S) C(N-1) 0 0 
risk of 1 scheme false tripping, 1 normal 
(2 cases) 2*C(N-1)*( l-a)*(l -p)*a*(l -p) 0 0 
risk of 1 scheme normal, 1 failure to trip, 
(2 cases) 2*C(N-l)*(l-a)*(l-p)*b*p 9.85E+00 I.13E-0I 
(N-l ) cases overall risk sum 9.85E+00 1.13E-01 
summing all 12 eases sum 1.25E-01 
cost of normal condition ($) C(N) 0 0 
2 schemes normal C(N)*( 1 -a)*( l-p)*( 1 -a)*( 1-p) 0 0 
2 schemes correct tripping C(N-2)*(l-b)*p*(l-b)*p 0 0 
1 scheme correct tripping, 1 normal (2 
cases) 2*C(N-l)*(l-a)*(l-p)*(l-b)*p 0 0 
summing all 16 cases sum 9.88E+00 1.25E-01 
Table 3.3 Risk of protection operations with the grid (N-2) insecure but (N-l) secure 
formulas 
2 series 
schemes: 
secure 
2 parallel 
schemes: 
dependable 
assumed cost of (N-2) contingency ($) C(N-2) 1.00E+04 1.00E+04 
assumed cost of damaging the equipment ($) C(G) 1.00E+06 1.00E+06 
risk of 2 schemes false tripping C(N-2)*a*(l-p)*a*(l-p) 0.062487501 95.04348845 
risk of 1 scheme false tripping, 1 correct 
tripping, (2 cases) 2*C(N-2)*a*(l -p)*( l-b)*p 0.00475265 0.194858637 
risk of 1 scheme false tripping, 1 failure to 
trip, (2 cases) 
2*[C(N-2)+C(G)]*a* (1 -
p)*b*p 0.024931882 0.012308144 
risk of 1 scheme correct tripping, 1 failure to 
trip, (2 cases) 
2*[C(N-2)+C(G)]*b*p*(l-
b) *P 0.00094813 1.26171 E-05 
risk of 2 schemes failure to trip [2*C(G)+C(N-2)]*b*p*b*p 4.90016E-05 7.85156E-09 
(N-2) cases overall risk sum 0.093169163 95.25066786 
assumed cost of (N- l)contingency(S) C(N-l) 0 0 
risk of 1 scheme false tripping, 1 normal (2 
cases) 
2*C(N-l)*(l-a)*(l -p)*a*(l -
P) 0 0 
risk of 1 scheme normal, 1 failure to trip, (2 
cases) 2*C(N-l)*(l-a)*(l -p)*b*p 9.85E+00 1.13E-01 
(N-l) cases overall risk sum 9.85E+00 1.13E-01 
summing all 12 eases sum 9.94E+00 9.54E+01 
cost of normal condition ($) C(N) 0 0 
2 schemes normal 
C(N)*(1 -a)*(l-p)*(l-a)*(l-
P) 0 0 
2 schemes correct tripping C(N-2)*(1 -b)*p*(l-b)*p 9.03688E-05 9.9875E-05 
1 scheme correct tripping, 1 normal (2 cases) 2*C(N-l)*(l-a)*(l-p)*(l- 0 0 
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b)*p 
summing all 16 cases sum 9.94E+00 9.54E+01 
When the two sets of protection schemes are installed on components that are 
electrically close, for example on adjacent lines, they may react to the same fault or 
disturbance. Thus their operations are no more independent. It is complex to precisely study 
the dependent events without going into excessive details of the relay location, protection 
principle, fault type, fault location, etc. In Table 3.4, it is assumed that the two sets of 
protection schemes are installed so close that the fault zones they can detect are the same. 
Table 3.4 Risk of protection operations for fully dependent case, with the grid(N-2) secure 
formulas 
2 series 
schemes: 
secure 
2 parallel 
schemes: 
dependable 
assumed cost of (N-2) contingency ($) C(N-2) 0 0 
assumed cost of damaging the equipment ($) C(G) 1.00E+06 1.00E+06 
risk of 2 schemes false tripping C(N-2)*a*(l-p)*a 0 0 
risk of 1 scheme false tripping, 1 correct tripping, 
(2 cases) 2*C(N-2)*a*(l -b)*p 
0 0 
risk of 1 scheme false tripping, 1 failure to trip, (2 
cases) 
2*[C(N-
2)+C(G)l*a*b*p 
0.0246875 0.0121875 
risk of 1 scheme correct tripping, 1 failure to trip, 
(2 cases) 0 
0 0 
risk of 2 schemes failure to trip 0 0 0 
(N-2) cases overall risk sum 0.0246875 0.0121875 
assumed cost of (N- l)contingency(S) C(N-l) 0 0 
risk of 1 scheme false tripping, 1 normal (2 cases) 
2*C(N-l)*(l-a)*(l-
P)*a 
0 0 
risk of 1 scheme normal, 1 failure to trip, (2 
cases) 2*C(N-l)*(l-a)*b*p 
9.85E+00 1.13 B-01 
(N-l)cases overall risk sum 9.85E+00 1.13E-01 
summing all 12 cases sum 9.88E+00 1 25E-01 
cost of normal condition ($) C(N) 0 0 
2 schemes normal 
C(N)*(1 -a)*(l-p)*(l-
a) 
0 0 
2 schemes correct tripping 0 0 0 
1 scheme correct tripping, 1 normal (2 cases) 
2*C(N-l)*(l-a)*(l-
b)*p 
0 0 
summing all 16 cases sum 9.88E+00 1.25E-01 
The conclusion again is the same as that from previous analysis. In Table 3.4 which 
represents the (N-2) secure condition, the more secure scheme has a higher overall risk, 
whereas things are reversed under the (N-2) insecure condition The table for the (N-l) 
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secure but (N-2) insecure case is omitted since the formulas and data are almost the same as 
the ones in Table 3.4. The only difference is that in the (N-2) insecure table, the cost of (N-2) 
contingency is set as $10,000 instead of $0 as in Table 3.4. This leads to the same result as in 
Table 3.3, with the risks of the two schemes being 9.94 and 95.4, respectively. As one can 
expect, if an even higher cost of grid collapse is assumed, say, $100,000, the advantage of the 
pro-security scheme would be much more apparent, with a risk of 10.5 compared to 953 of 
the more dependable scheme. 
3.2.2 Risk versus Probability Analysis 
The factors contributing to the risk of relay failures are the probabilities of different 
failure modes and the corresponding cost to the grid. In Subsection 3.2.1, the variation of the 
overall risk is substantially credited to different failure costs under different operating 
conditions. This is because in the risk analysis it is assumed that for each relay, conditional 
probabilities of "relay false tripping" and "relay failure to trip" remain constant under 
different power system operational conditions. Recent work has shown that this assumption 
needs slight adjustment since the probabilities of relay failures also change under different 
operation conditions (Seegers et al., 2001; Wang & Bollen, 2001). It is shown that the 
probability of some relays "false tripping" in a stressed grid is higher than that in a lightly 
loaded grid, but the probability of their "failure to trip" in a stressed grid is lower than that in 
a lightly loaded grid. 
The impact of loading level on relay false operations in steady state is summarized as 
follows: 
• The protection design and relay setting philosophies are to avoid influence 
between protection and grid loadability. There are some relays with the operation 
principle immune to loading levels (Seegers et al., 2001): 
o Current differential relays are almost completely immune to increased load on 
a protected line. As the load current increases, the spurious differential current 
caused by finite CT accuracy will increase, but at the same time, the 
restraining current will increase as well. The percentage characteristic ensures 
relay stability for any amount of overload. 
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o Phase comparison relays respond to phase relation between the currents at all 
the terminals of a protected line. As the load current increases, the relationship 
of the phase angles of the currents at the line terminals remains consistent 
thereby preventing false tripping. 
• It has been observed by other researchers that some relays are inherently 
susceptible to load level impact due to their operation principle (Seegers et al., 
2001; Wang & Bollen, 2001): 
o The overcurrent relays may operate unnecessarily because of measurement 
inaccuracy during high current situations, such as cold load picking up; 
o Different distance relay characteristics will exhibit different responses to 
loading. In general, distance replays are less susceptible to the impact of 
steady state loading levels, whereas transient currents may cause false 
operations. 
The potential impact of disturbances on protection systems is also studied and 
summarized in Table 3.5 (Wang & Bollen, 2001). 
Table 3.5 Power system disturbances and corresponding impacts on protective relays* 
Disturbance type Undervoltage Overcurrent Impedance Overvoltage 
Voltage transient V X X V 
Current transient X V X X 
Voltage swell X X X V 
Voltage sag V V V X 
Voltage fluctuation V X V V 
Short-time overload X V V X 
* Legend of the impact level: X — minor or no impact; V -- potential impact. 
In summary, based on the work quoted, the impact of loading on relay false 
operations shows that the conditional probability of false tripping, P (A j NF) of some relays 
could change under different operation conditions. This variation would contribute to the 
overall risk of the protection system unreliability. To gain more perspective, assume relays 
are designed and set to operate with a proper balance between security and dependability in 
reducing the overall risk to the system. When the grid is highly stressed, the probability of 
relay false tripping becomes even higher. With all other factors remaining the same, shifting 
the relay reliability towards security is necessary to preserve utmost security of the system. 
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Thus the conclusion is that the relays should be shifted more towards security under stressful 
loading conditions. Table 3.6 provides a numerical explanation of this conclusion The data 
are from the aforementioned Example 1. The only difference is that the value of conditional 
false tripping probability (a) in Table 3.6 is considerably higher than that in Example 1. 
Comparison of Table 3.6 with Example 1 shows that the change in the relay conditional false 
tripping probability alone may have apparent influence on the overall risk of protection 
failures. 
Table 3.6 Risk influenced by the change in probability 
formulas one relay 
series scheme of 
two relays (secure) 
parallel scheme of two 
relays (dependable) 
conditional false tripping a 0.06 0.0036 0.1164 
conditional failure to trip b 0.025 0.049375 0.000625 
fault rate P 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
unconditional false tripping a*(l-p) 0.059994 0.00359964 0.11638836 
unconditional failure to trip b*p 0.0000025 4.9375E-06 6.25E-08 
normal (l-a)*(l-p) 0.939906 0.99630036 0.88351164 
correct tripping (l-b)*p 0.0000975 9.50625E-05 9.99375E-05 
cost of false tripping C(N-1) 52 52 52 
cost of failure to trip C(G) 1.00E+06 1.00E+06 1.00E+06 
overall risk 
C(N-l)*a*(l-
p)+C(G)*b*p 5.12468128 6.11469472 
3.3 Nature of the Protection System 
The protection philosophy needs improvement as researchers have realized in recent 
years (Phadke et al., 1999). In this section, the author examined the nature of protection so 
the weak point of relaying system performance can be identified. The goal of this analysis is 
to lay the ground for proposing the adaptive protection in sections 3.5 through 3.7. 
Considering the overall protection design in power system, there are two aspects 
involved that can be decoupled to a certain extent. One is the individual relay mechanism at 
the micro level and the other is the protection system scheme at the macro level. The 
characteristic differences of the two are listed below for further comparison and analysis: 
• Individual relay mechanism implies the theory, principle, or decision-making 
algorithm of each relay. 
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o It reflects the functional relationship of output signals and input signals in the 
form of curves, tables or formulas. 
o It relies more on the scientific information, e.g. studies of short circuit, 
stability and disturbance propagation. 
o The techniques have always developed to produce better relay mechanisms, 
from over-current relays to differential relays, from distance relays to 
traveling wave relays. 
• Protection system scheme is the strategy with which all relays are organized and 
the way in which they cooperate and coordinate with each other. 
o The major concern in protection system scheme is the coordination between 
primary protection and backup protection. 
o The detailed decision-making mechanism inside the relay is considered as a 
black box at this level; only the output signals and their interaction matter, 
o It has been more of an art than science. Therefore it needs to be reconsidered 
in a theoretic and mathematical way. 
As one can realize from de-coupling these two logic levels, more study focusing on 
improving the protection system scheme is needed for a potential leap in relay system 
enhancement. 
The reason of protection being "dependable" rather than "secure" can be analyzed 
from this layered point of view. The origin of this inherent limitation of component 
protection may trace back to the natural evolution of protection system scheme during the 
past seventy years (Sidhu et al., 2002). The features of protection system scheme as it is 
adopted presently are summarized as below: 
• All relays are self-contained in the sense that they implement the measurements 
and logic individually, and trigger output actions independently which are 
tripping signals sent to circuit breakers; 
• Unreliability of protection is unavoidable due to part failures including hidden 
failures etc. The strategies for combating it are different for the two 
aforementioned aspects of reliability: 
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o Dependability is enforced by multiple redundancies of relays. Designated 
backup relays can backup primary relays locally or in the immediate region of 
adjacent one or two buses; 
o Security is considered less of a problem in the protection history. Occasionally 
when a specific relay tends to falsely trip excessively, an additional series 
supervisory relay is deployed to form a more secure tripping decision. 
• Since many relays, both primary and backup, may control the same tripping 
device in a logically parallel way, coordination among relays is realized by using 
fixed discrete time delay steps; 
• There is uncertainty in each decision-making step because of inevitable noise 
from measurements, insufficient/erroneous information etc. But each relay 
generates deterministic tripping or no-tripping decisions. Uncertainty is expressed 
by simply applying margins in relay settings. 
t 
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Figure 3.3 Logic diagram of existing protection system scheme for one protected component 
Above is the protection system scheme that protection engineers recommended many 
decades ago (Sidhu et al., 2002). The logic used for protecting a power system device is 
shown in Fig. 3.2. It has been a smart and inexpensive model of the physical phenomena 
based on the techniques at that time. But more requirements as well as problems are 
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emerging. This invokes the thoughts that today might be the time for establishing a more 
advanced scheme. The new scheme is expected to be based on developing techniques, not 
only in the domain of power systems, but also in mathematics, control theory, computer 
science, communication applications, sensor and measurement techniques, and many 
breakthroughs in related areas. 
3.4 An Intermediate Solution: SPS 
Protection design philosophy has been slowly but obviously changing. The 
improvement is in the sense of shifting the bias from local protection to regional protection, 
from assuring dependability to pursuing security. 
A major advancement was the introduction of System Protection Scheme (SPS) to 
expand the protection philosophy from a component level to a system level. According to 
NERC (2002, p.2), SPS is defined as "an automatic protection system (also known as a 
remedial action scheme) designed to detect abnormal or predetermined system conditions, 
and take corrective actions other than and/or in addition to the isolation of faulted 
components to maintain system reliability. Such action may include changes in demand, 
generation (MW and Mvar), or system configuration to maintain system stability, acceptable 
voltage, or power flows. An SPS does not include (a) underfrequency or undervoltage load 
shedding or (b) fault conditions that must be isolated or (c) out-of-step relaying (not 
designed as an integral part of an SPS). " The distinctiveness of this concept is that the 
purpose of protection is no longer confined to assuring the safety of power system 
components. 
There has been a clarification of the acronym of SPS : 
System Protection Scheme (SPS) is the common name used when the focus for 
the protection is on the power system supply capability rather than on a specific 
equipment. SPS was earlier the acronym for Special Protection Scheme, with 
basically the same meaning as System Protection Scheme is today [1.1]. The word 
'special' is nowadays replaced by 'system', since it is more relevant to describe 
this type of protection. (Karlsson et al., 2000, p. 147) 
Today there are thousands of SPS installed all over the world (Karlsson, et al., 2000). 
Strictly speaking, no two SPS are exactly the same due to their individual and problem-
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specific design. Basically they are classified as two types: centralized and distributed. From 
the mechanism of their sensing, they can also be classified into two types: event-based and 
response-based. The pros and cons for both types have been discussed in length (Karlsson, et 
al., 2000). 
One major contribution of various SPS is to incorporate more input signals to control 
and protection systems. This means more degrees of freedom are available through advanced 
technologies in the area of measurement and communications. Some typical inputs are listed 
as follows (Begovic, et al., 2001): 
• Active power flows in the network 
• Voltage magnitude and reactive power flows 
• Angles between buses 
• Impedance 
• Resistance and rate-of-change of resistance 
• Frequency 
• Rate of change of frequency 
• Spinning reserve 
• Cold reserve 
• Inertia constant H 
• Load 
• Weather/season 
• Relays and breaker status 
Also practical algorithms are required to process all data efficiently. Another 
achievement of SPS is the growth of the set of available control actions over the past years 
(Begovic, et al., 2001): 
• Out-of-step relaying 
• Load shedding 
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• Controlled power system separation 
• Generation dropping 
• Fault clearing 
• Fast valving 
• Dynamic braking 
• Generator voltage control 
• Capacitor/reactor switching and static VAR compensation 
• Load control 
• Supervision and control of key protection systems 
• Voltage reduction (actions of OLTC transformers: blocking; reducing the voltage 
set-point) 
• Phase shifting 
• Tie line rescheduling 
• Reserve increasing (temporary reactive power overload of synchronous machines) 
• Generation shifting 
• HVDC power modulation 
But it was reported that quite a few of SPS operations resulted in unwanted tripping 
of the systems. These unnecessary operations are not frequent, or even rare over the SPS in-
service time span. However, compared to the also infrequent correct operation occasions they 
are noteworthy (Anderson & LeReverend, 1996). This indicates that the SPS needs a 
thorough review. 
Furthermore, SPS brings more complexity (Nielsen, Coultes, Gold, Taylor, & 
Traynor, 1988). Expanding or modifying dedicated "system protection" on top of existing 
protection systems would cause more and more coordination problems. Because component 
and system protection are designed differently and installed separately to control the same set 
of power system components. The SPS may control several protection devices in different 
31 
established relay schemes at different locations and with various settings. Without proper 
coordination, SPS can cause conflicts with conventional protection. For example, transfer trip 
signal from SPS and local tripping decision may be different; remote load shedding and local 
load shedding may differ both in time delay, amount and steps. There is no standard practice 
of overriding/blocking between commands from the two. 
Therefore an additional layer of "system protection" network made of dedicated 
system protection devices is not a perfect modification to the established protection system 
structure. A more desirable design to close the gap between component protection and 
system protection would be an integrated protection system. 
The work accomplished thus far in adaptive protection implies that flexibly tuning 
existing protection devices for both component protection and system protection is feasible. 
The same set of devices implementing the jobs of both component protection and system 
protection would circumvent the aforementioned coordination complexity. Under different 
operation conditions, the bias towards security or dependability is changing and balanced. 
For example, dependability is preferable during light load conditions because of larger 
system margin and less probability of cascading events. An adaptive relay should be able to 
take both local component sensing and remote system sensing into decision making to fulfill 
both requirements. Thus tuning between different modes discretely or continually enables 
one overall design. This is based on the tenability or intelligence of computer relays. At 
present dedicated SPS can be considered as a transit period of patching system protection 
functions to existing component protection systems, before mature adaptive protection 
network is widely adopted. 
3.5 Proposed Architecture 
3.5.1 Hardware Architecture 
As the capabilities of relays expand and new technologies are introduced, it is 
important to understand how adaptive protection can be extended into preventive and 
emergency control. One could think of three layers of hierarchical hardware needed for wide 
area protection. The lowest level of a distributed control system for local protection occurs at 
the relay level. A "relay" could be a simple classical relay, a modern digital relay, or an 
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Intelligent Electronic Device (IED). IED is defined by IEEE (1994, p.8) as "any device 
incorporating one or more processors with the capability to receive or send data/control 
from or to an external source (e.g., electronic multifunction meters, digital relays, 
controllers) At each relay location, modern technology transforms the sensor, relay and 
breaker into a switch with sophisticated computation and multiple input variables. The 
middle layer at the substation level contains many such units, each able to operate 
independently but also capable of being interconnected through a substation computer. They 
realize protection for small regional systems. Finally, at the highest level, each substation is 
interconnected with neighboring substations for line protection but can also be connected 
with a central computer for wide area protection and control. 
As a result, future substation protection and switching control sys tems will resemble 
those in Fig. 3.4, which is a modification of the substation control system described in the 
previous stage of the research (Damborg, Kim, Huang, Venkata, Phadke, 2000). The figure 
of hardware architecture illustrates the substation configuration and the information flow 
both inside of and between substations. 
» : Control Signal 
-—•: Measurement (Voltage, Current, etc.) 
LC : Line Control : Communication Link 
SCC : Substation Control 
see 
- Substation 
Central Control 
Figure 3.4 A coordinated wide area protection and control system 
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In Fig. 3.4, each line-end is equipped with sensors (S), a line controller (LC) and 
breakers and actuating circuitry (B). Sensors include conventional ones as voltage 
transformers (VTs) and advanced ones as phasor measurement sensors. The line controller is 
the successor to the modern computer relay, sometimes referred to as the adaptive relay in 
this document. In addition to a local control for each breaker, there is a Substation 
Coordination Controller (SCC) that receives signals from each sensor at the substation and 
can control each breaker at the substation. This extra level of substation logic allows for 
breaker action based on the state of all lines and bus bars at the substation. In the present 
context SCC could be a module implemented in local SCADA computer, or an individual 
device installed in the substation. Since the SCC-controlled set of breakers overlaps with the 
LC-controlled set of breakers, coordination among SCCs and LCs is needed. To enable the 
coordination, a local network with specific communication protocols is expected. The SCC 
and LCs are connected to the same local network so information can be easily shared, 
including measurement from sensors and system indices from high-level modules etc. Wide 
area control can be accomplished by communication between the SCC and a Central 
Controller. The Central Controller coordinates wide area protection actions with all 
substations. 
The role of this system is to monitor and control all the breakers in the substation. 
Through monitoring, the system will provide alerts in the event of breaker/relay failures, 
including hidden failures when possible, and will assure proper settings for coordination. The 
system will also be given an active role to change settings upon command in preventive 
mode, and to coordinate all breakers at the substation to isolate faults based on both local and 
remote information in the emergency mode. An example would be to de-energize a minimal 
portion of a substation in the event of a breaker failure that may affect multiple lines. 
This system will be a major element in a wide area control system that involves 
protection devices. It must communicate with immediate neighbors for rapid tripping of far-
end line faults and for redundant relays coordination. It must also communicate with the 
central control system for truly wide area emergency management. 
While each end of each transmission line must be protected by the operation of a 
relay/breaker system, the SCC can provide a coordinated response of all breakers at a 
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substation. LCs can as well coordinate with each other through communication and 
distributed decision-making. Further, these substations can be interconnected throughout a 
system to provide coordinated system response. This system can take advantage of enhanced 
computation (at relays, in substations and centrally) and modern communications to respond 
not only to faults but also to threats such as unusual loading or weather. Through a network 
of substation controllers the protection/control system is organized over a wide area. 
3.5.2 Functional Architecture 
In Section 3.5.1, controllers are proposed to coordinate all switching actions. This 
section discusses how all the bgical functions are organized and cooperate with each other. 
It is within the scope of the logic protection system scheme defined in Section 3.3. Contrary 
to existing protection system scheme that is summarized in Section 3.3, a new one is 
proposed for integrating component and system protection: 
• Relays are not completely self-contained in the sense that they implement the 
measurements individually, but independent logic and output actions of tripping 
breakers are restricted to primary protection functions; 
• Relay backup function is realized mutually among relays without intentional time 
delay, with information from peer relays through communications among the 
networked relays both locally and remotely; 
• Since many relays may control the same tripping device in parallel logic, 
coordination is realized at a higher decision level through communications or at 
the peer level through coordinated distributed decisions; 
• Uncertainty is expressed by each relay, thus the output of each relay is a pair of 
tripping decision and the corresponding certainty value, or a set of such pairs; 
• The higher-level decision controller is able to process more input, supervising and 
tuning other relays and making inference decisions during emergencies. 
To summarize the proposed functional architecture of adaptive protection, the 
features are listed in Table 3.7. The corresponding functions as they exist presently are also 
provided in this table for comparative purposes. 
35 
The assumption in the proposed architecture is that the backup functions rely heavily 
on latest communications and computer technologies, which provide more information for 
the decision-making process. Therefore, incorrect operations resulted from complex system 
behavior such as hidden failures, and noisy measurements could be harnessed. System-wide 
information like the vulnerability index can also be incorporated to decision-making 
procedure for the consideration of stability maintenance. It is believed that the proposed 
protection philosophy results in higher speed in backup operations by eliminating the 
intentional time delay in exchange for a shorter communication time delay. At the same time, 
fall back solutions for failure of communication links need to be figured out. It is to be 
stressed that primary protection is expected to remain the same for both current and future 
schemes. It is also worth mentioning that this is an open structure so more new developments 
can be easily incorporated if any further technique improvements are available. 
The author is aware that "A growing number of protective schemes are primarily 
designed for improving power system stability or enhancing system security. These schemes 
... are safeguards designed to alter or preserve the system structure, security, or 
connectivity" (Anderson, 1999, p.853). However, this research does not intend to design A 
SCHEME for the purpose of maintaining system stability. Instead, a change of protection 
philosophy always with the consideration of stability in mind is the goal of this research. 
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Table 3.7 Protection system functional architecture: current and future 
Current Future (Proposed) 
Func­
tionality 
Self-contained: 
• Individual measurements and 
logic 
• Independent output actions 
Not completely self-contained: 
• Individual measurements 
• Dependent decision-making logic and 
output actions 
Redun­
dancy 
Relays can backup other relays 
locally or remotely (one or two 
adjacent busses) 
• Backup functions are realized mutually 
among networked peer relays 
• Information from peer relays is shared 
through communications among the 
networked relays both locally and remotely 
Coordi­
nation 
• Parallel logic of "OR" 
• More than one stage of time 
delay in each relay 
• At a higher decision level or at distributed 
decision-making level 
• Realized through communications 
• Without intentional time delay 
Uncer­
tainty 
Implicitly represented by 
applying margins to form 
conservative settings. It is more 
of art than science. 
Explicitly expressed by each relay: the output 
of each relay is a pair of fault 
location/tripping decision and the 
corresponding certainty value, or a set of such 
pairs 
Supervi­
sion 
• Provided for a specific relay 
tending to falsely trip 
• An extra supervisory relay is 
deployed to form a compound 
relay module 
• Tripping decision is given 
from logically serial control 
of "AND" 
• Provided for all networked relays 
• Peer relays can supervise mutually at no 
extra effort 
• The higher-level decision controller is able 
to process more input, supervising and 
tuning other relays and making inference 
decisions during emergencies 
3.6 Decision-Making Algorithms 
As summarized in Section 2.1, all of definitions of adaptive protection are suggesting 
on-line altering of relay settings (Damborg et al., 2000). This feature works well under the 
preventive mode of system operation. However, under the emergency mode, there is no time 
to reset and validate relay settings. The relays should make decisions almost instantaneously 
based on real-time operational conditions of the power system. That is to say, the adaptive 
feature needs to be implemented within the relay decision-making algorithm. In company 
with architectural improvements described in the previous section, it is the addition of 
intelligence into the decision-making process that distinguishes adaptive protection from 
traditional protection schemes and exhibits the potential power for the future. 
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3.6.1 Existing Algorithms 
A protective relay is usually required to make a correct decision in a very short time. 
Therefore, the decision-making algorithm should be effective, fast, and versatile to include 
various system operating conditions. On the other hand, it is usually difficult to choose a 
simple criterion that accommodates the large numbers of possible system conditions 
(topology, load level, etc.) and incidents for relay settings. Therefore an algorithm that 
incorporates every criterion into a manageable computation burden is needed. In the 
following, a single-criterion decision algorithm and two multiple-criteria decision algorithms 
are described as existing algorithms before the new algorithm is proposed. 
3.6.1.1 Single-Criterion Decision Algorithm 
In most existing relays, the decision-making algorithm is the characteristic function in 
the form of a curve with threshold(s). The function has 0/1 as the output, which is dependent 
on input signals and their derivatives. As an example, Fig. 3.4 gives the illustration of such a 
function for a three-zone distance relay. The difference between Bus2 and the reach of Zonel 
is the setting margin, the conservative solution to uncertainties. The advantage of the single-
criterion decision algorithm is its simplicity and low cost. But it is not suitable for 
incorporating more than one decision-making criterion. 
Confidence level 
Tripping with 0.3s delay 
Tripping instantaneously Tripping with 0.6s delay 
T 1 
Bus2 : Bus) I 
-i : : 0 
Busl 
-4-
Zonel Zonel 
Figure 3.5 Example of tripping logic in a deterministic distance relay 
3.6.1.2 Multiple -Criteria Decision Algorithms 
When more than one criterion is involved in making the final decision of a relay 
operation, a multiple-criteria decision algorithm is applied to achieve more reliable output. 
Each relay characteristic function represents one criterion. Redundant relay characteristic 
functions participate in the final decision-making. Two existing multiple-criteria decision 
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algorithms are discussed below for illustrative purposes. It is not an exhaustive list of 
algorithms that protection schemes adopt. 
• Simple Voting 
From more than one 0/1 output from relay characteristic functions, simple voting 
such as n out of m (n<m) can make the final decision. Examples of extreme conditions for 
simple voting are serial and parallel settings, i.e. "AND" and "OR" voting, which are used in 
most secure and backup conditions, respectively. This is very similar to the figure in a recent 
paper by Phadke, which thoroughly explores the adaptive protection concept for hidden 
failures (2002). In this algorithm, increased hardware investment is the price for a more 
reliable decision. The additional computational burden is manageable because only the 
simple logic of "AND" and "OR" are involved. However, the improvement in reliability is 
also limited since a simple voting scheme cannot reflect the difference of relays. Due to the 
nature of different types of relaying principles (e.g. overcurrent, current differential, etc.), the 
accuracy of measurement and correctiveness of the judgments from different relays may be 
different. Therefore, their voting rights are not necessarily equal. 
• Voting with Weighting Factors 
Pre-defined, adjustable weighting factors for each relay within the backup scheme are 
introduced and claimed working well for more reliable protection (Tan, Crossley, Kirschen, 
Goody, Downes, 2000). The decision-making process is that the 0/1 output from each relay is 
multiplied by suitable weighting factors, then added up and compared to a certain threshold 
to produce the final output. The advantage of this algorithm is that unequal weighting factors 
reflect the relative importance of different relaying principles. The limitation is that 
predefined weighting factors cannot reflect real-time relay conditions. 
Summarizing all existing algorithms, it is noticed that none of them is able to reflect 
the inherent uncertainty relays encounter. This topic is studied in the following section. 
3 6.2 Application of Fuzzy Theory in Modeling Uncertainties 
3.6.2.1 Uncertainty Study 
"So far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain. And so far as they are 
certain, they do not refer to reality." 
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—Albert Einstein 
Mathematical modeling of physical systems is often complicated by the presence of 
uncertainties. Protective relay algorithms, for example, entail uncertainties in the process of 
measuring, communication and calculation, etc. The presence of uncertainties impacts the 
validation of the relay tripping decision. Even though significant effort has been made to 
incorporate uncertainties into relay models, a systematic approach instead of intuitive 
solutions has not been presented. 
The author believes that the discussion of uncertainties, where they are from and the 
approaches to hedge their impact provides insight into the source of the problem. Further, it 
can lead to the solutions as proper algorithms to model uncertainties. 
The basic approach of protection devices is to define equipment status by identifying 
voltage and current waveform patterns. This could be difficult if uncertainties are present and 
not modeled quantitatively. Uncertainties come from both measurement collected and 
settings predefined therefore virtually inevitable. Numerous researches have been conducted 
in identification of the key sources of uncertainty (Aggarwal & Johns, 1997). Here are some 
examples of the source of uncertainties: 
• Operation condition changes: load/generation/topology 
• Various network configurations 
• Different fault condition 
• Inaccuracies caused by measuring equipment and noise introduced by EMI 
• Possible missing of information 
• Approximation in relay settings and coordination trade off 
• Existence of hidden failures in protection ^sterns, with various failure modes 
(Phadke et al., 1995) 
Ronen (1988), a physicist showed that uncertainties are inherent in nature, or more 
correctly in the way the nature is observed. "Uncertainty principle" and "Complementary 
Principle" introduced in 1920s legitimated the role of uncertainties in physics. Uncertainties 
are introduced by fragmentation of nature. It is the way human learns by isolation of small 
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parts of nature to deal with each part separately. The introduction of "system concept" is 
based on the assumption that influence from the surroundings is perfectly known which is not 
absolutely correct. 
Uncertainties are brought in by measurement, which is interference between the 
measurement device and the system. It can be corrected to some extert, but not completely. 
New techniques are applied to reduce uncertainty in measurement, for example, PMU, by 
providing precise phasor information, could potentially aid in a more efficient relay decision 
making. 
However, the existing architecture and algorithms of relays have not made the most 
of the currently available information. For problems where data are limited and where 
simplifying assumptions have been used, as in a relay, a robust algorithm that models 
uncertainty appropriately thus reducing the uncertainty in decisions is of key importance. 
3.6.2.2 Comparing Probability Theory with Fuzzy Theory in 
Modeling Uncertainties 
It has been realized that there are uncertainties in our universe. Or rather, absolute 
certainty is rare. In particular, uncertainty comes from missing/ incomplete and/or 
imprecise/incorrect information. And imprecision is an inherent property of the world 
external to an observer. 
Technically capturing the characteristics of the uncertainty plays an important role in 
decision making procedure. Only an algorithm robust enough to incorporate various 
uncertainties possesses the greatest likelihood of success in the real world. The existing 
relays adopt an approach of "threshold margins" for representations of measurement 
imprecision and "wait and see" for all possible erroneous decisions resulting from data and 
devices imperfection. This research makes an effort in promoting a more systematic 
algorithm for quantification of uncertainty than this primitive mixture of "art and science". 
Before elaborating the proposed application of fuzzy theory in adaptive relaying, it is 
worthwhile to compare the elationship of fuzzy theory and another more widely used 
approach in uncertainty modeling, probability theory. 
Probability theory and fuzzy sets are currently among the most visible mathematical 
frameworks allowing conceptualization of uncertainty. It is true that "One of the most 
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controversial issues in uncertainty modeling and information sciences is the relationship 
between probability theory and fuzzy sets" (Dubois & Prade, 1993, p. 1059). 
This is because there have been quite some similarities, mix-ups and 
misunderstandings between the two. The fuzziness and probability are orthogonal concepts 
that characterize different aspects of human experience. If probability is an objective 
approach then fuzziness is the subjective way to represent the uncertainty. 
Probability theory is a mathematical framework to represent the likelihood of 
phenomena with uncertain outcomes. Statistical or random uncertainties are inherent in the 
physical world and have been studied thoroughly for centuries. So far the best accepted 
approach in modeling it is the probabilistic theory. 
Another category of uncertainty arises in human cognition process, including 
information extraction and reasoning. For example, in Section 3.2 it is observed that for a 
highly stressed power grid the protection should bias more towards security than towards 
dependability under normal conditions. Implementing such philosophy in relays would 
introduce the problem of quantifying the concepts of "highly stressed", "more towards 
security", "towards dependability" and "normal conditions". The perception phenomenon 
can be neither characterized nor measured using statistical theory. The mathematical 
modeling and management of this cognitive uncertainty is by fuzzy set theory. 
The fuzzy set theory has been started in late 60's (Zadeh, 1965). Although related to 
probability, fuzziness is a different concept. Fuzziness is a type of deterministic uncertainty. 
It describes the event class ambiguity. Fuzziness measures the degree to which an event 
occurs, not whether it occurs. The amorphous intelligence of fuzzy theory emulates the 
efficient and robust process of the brain, featuring aggregation of continuous distribution of 
attributes and relative grades of information (Kosko, 1990). 
While membership grades can be determined with probability densities in mind, there 
are other interpretations as well not in agreement with frequencies or probabilities calculus. 
In fact, from a mathematical perspective, fuzzy sets and probability exist as parts of a 
greater generalized information theory and are among many formalism methods for 
representing uncertainty (Klir, 1992). In essence, fuzzy logic and probability theory are the 
most powerful tools to overcome the imperfection in information system. Fuzzy logic is 
42 
mainly responsible for representation and processing of vague data. Probability theory is 
mainly responsible for representation and processing of randomness. The following table 
clarifies the differences between the two theories (Tizhoosh, 1997). 
Table 3.8 Differences between fuzzy logic and probability theory 
Probability Measure Membership Function 
Arouses from the question whether or 
not an event occurs 
Arouses from the question to what degree an 
event occurs 
Assuming the event class is crisply 
defined 
Assuming the event class is ambiguously defined 
Before an event happens After the event happened 
Assuming the law of non 
contradiction holds 
When the law of noncontradiction is violated, 
hence it can cope with inconsistency 
Calculates the probability that an ill-
known variable x ranging on U hits 
the well-known set A 
Calculates the membership of a well-known 
variable x ranging on U hits the ill-known set A 
Randomness Vagueness 
Modeling linguistic variables and used in 
inference processes 
Measure Theory Set Theory 
Domain is 2U (Boolean Algebra) Domain is [0,1 ]U (Cannot be a Boolean 
Algebra) 
Probability and fuzzy sets are already jointly used in several domains of applications, 
and it provides a richer uncertainty modeling environment. A fuzzy probability extends the 
traditional notion of a probability when there are outcomes that belong to several event 
classes at the same time but to different degrees. According to Dubois and Prade (1993, 
p. 1066), "...instead of considering probability and fuzzy sets as conflicting rivals, it sounds 
more promising to build bridges and take advantages of the enlarged framework for 
modeling uncertainty and vagueness they jointly bring us to. " 
It is important to note that neither fuzziness nor probability govern the physical 
processes in nature. They are brought in by humans to compensate for their own limitations. 
Detailed theoretical discussion of the relationships between fuzziness and probability may be 
found in the reference (Dubois, 1993). 
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3.6.2.3 Advantages of Fuzzy Set Theory 
Fuzzy set theory simulates human intelligence in trading off between significance and 
precision. It is a convenient way to map an input space to an output space. As Lotfi Zadeh, 
who is considered to be the father of fuzzy logic, once remarked: " In almost every case you 
can build the same product without fuzzy logic, but fuzzy is faster and cheaper"; "As 
complexity rises, precise statements lose meaning and meaningful statements lose precision " 
(The MathWorks Inc., 1995). 
• Fuzzy logic is conceptually easy to understand. 
The mathematical concepts behind fuzzy reasoning are as simple as common sense. 
What makes fuzzy nice is the "naturalness" of its approach instead of any far-reaching 
complexity. It is based on natural language which is convenient and efficient. Since fuzzy 
logic is built atop the structures of qualitative description used in everyday language, it is 
easy to use. Therefore applying fuzzy theory in protection is straightforward for relay 
engineers who have been working this art on both science and intuition. 
• Fuzzy logic is tolerant of imprecise data. 
The function of relays is designed to make precise decisions based on imprecise, even 
erroneous or missing information. Actually fuzzy theory is one of the most efficient ways in 
modeling uncertainty in decision making process. 
• Fuzzy logic can flexibly model nonlinear functions of arbitrary complexity. 
Protection is a highly nonlinear function, highly relying on people experience. While 
fuzzy set theory can match any set of input-output data. It can be built on the experience of 
experts. It is also easy to layer more functionality on top of fuzzy modules. So by applying 
fuzzy logic to relays, people are still in control of the decision-making module. 
Microprocessor relays have made this flexibility a unique advantage over traditional relays. 
There are other Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools which lend themselves very well to 
the area of power system protection, such as Expert Systems (ES), Fuzzy Logic systems 
(FL), and Artificial Neural Networks (ANN). Among them, ES has been mostly restricted to 
problems with less stringent time response requirement, like off-line relay settings and 
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coordination. According to IEEE PSRC G4 report submitted by Kezunovic, et al. (1999, 
p. 3 5), "Expert Systems are well suited to smaller problem domains that have narrow fields of 
expertise." In the complex environment like wide area protection, it is very difficult to 
narrow down the scope of the ES. ANN with the ability of mapping complex and highly non­
linear input/output patterns provides an attractive solution to some of the long-standing 
problems in protection, like phase-selection But the difficulties in application to protection 
come from its excessive dependence on training data set. This is particularly not suitable for 
restructing utilities since the system is not running as it was designed. Therefore simple 
intelligence algorithms such as fuzzy logic are proposed for adaptive protection in wide area. 
FL is considered a powerful tool in relay decision-making since it is much closer in spirit to 
human thinking and natural language than traditional logic systems. Its mechanism of 
simplifying complexity ensures real-time response, which is the key requirement for relay 
applications. 
3.6.3 Proposed Algorithm: Voting with Real-Time Intelligent Factors 
To ensure real-time response of the adaptive protection system, modeling 
aforementioned uncertainty without sacrificing speed is necessary. More over, modern relays 
are required to perform advanced functions. The bias of security and dependability needs to 
be adjusted in real time; relay decision may base on multi-criteria with various weighting 
factors. Therefore, voting with real-time intelligent factors, such as a fuzzy factor is 
proposed. 
As an example, a fuzzy distance relaying function is represented in Fig. 3.5. Instead 
of making 0/1 decisions with time delays as shown in Fig. 3.4, fuzzy decisions with real-time 
confidence level membership functions are made almost instantaneously. The curves of each 
relay characteristic function are set according to power system parameters, pre-calculated 
contingency analysis, and even experience. The settings could be modified according to real­
time relay conditions. For example, failures in relay self-checking or outdated input signals 
would decrease its confidence level. Each relay sends out multiple decisions and the 
corresponding confidence level values. Multiple redundancies of relay make it possible to 
estimate the fault status even with part of the information missing. After collecting all 
relevant information, a voting scheme is realized in the relay by computation and ranking of 
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confidence values for each decision. When the result with the highest ranking is greater than 
a certain threshold, corresponding action is taken immediately by the relay. And other peer 
relays are informed of the operation. The setting of the threshold can be tuned according to 
real-time system conditions, such as a vulnerability index. Thus the bias towards security or 
dependability can be shifted continuously within a reasonable region. In practice, the 
characteristic function of an adaptive rely may be multi-dimensional and quite complex. It 
incorporates more input signals than Z apparent only. Fig. 3.5 is just for the purpose of concept 
illustration and comparison with Fig. 3.4. 
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Figure 3.6 Example of characteristic function in a fuzzy distance relay 
For primary protection, the action of tripping breakers is usually taken directly 
because a normal primary protection function has the decision confidence level of higher 
than the threshold. For backup functions with the confidence level less than the threshold, the 
final judgment is lei to a relay with more information from other relays on the 
communication network. This relay could be local or remote, peer relay or higher-level 
intelligent controller, or even the same primary relay after getting enough information from 
other relays. No time delay is introduced on purpose. The only delay is from the 
communication time among relays. Thus a fault is cleared as fast as possible, after a well-
informed decision is reached. The forming of the final decision is slower than that of 
traditional primary relays but it is believed to be more proper. Additional redundant 
information will hopefully contribute to making a proper final decision. Consequently, there 
is less probability of false tripping of the relays. 
This algorithm could be viewed as a more general form of existing algorithms 
presented in Section 3.6.1. The additional computation expense of this algorithm varies. For 
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individual relay characteristics, the procedure of fuzzification could be a membership 
function calculation if there is a close form expression, or through a simple table look-up. For 
the final decision-making it might be simple arithmetic computation followed by 
defuzzification at a certain threshold. The total calculation time is probably able to be limited 
to within 10 ms (Kezunovic, et al., 1999). 
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Figure 3.7 Logic diagram of the proposed protection system for one protected component 
Through a simple example, the proposed architecture and algorithm of the intelligent 
voting scheme is illustrated for a small five-bus power system. Fig. 3.6 shows how one relay 
on the network processes a backup protection function with the aid from peer relays. Assume 
that there is a fault between bus 3 and bus 4. The primary protection at one side or both sides 
of the two buses fails to sense the zone 1 fault. This extreme condition may happen due to 
hidden failures, either in relay settings or the relay hardware (Phadke, 2002). Backup relays 
A, B and C all see the fault remotely with different confidence levels as indicated in Fig. 3.7, 
labeled as 7A, ZB and Zc Assuming relay B measures the apparent impedance Zb in zone 2, 
which is the line between bus 3 and bus 4, with a confidence value of 0.7. Also % could 
mean a fault in its zone 1, which is the line between bus 2 and bus 3, with a confidence value 
of 0.55. The threshold is set to 1. Thus relay B by itself cannot make a firm decision. 
However, intelligent information collected from relays A and C could help relay B to make a 
proper decision adaptively. In relay B, after collecting signals from the peer relays, the 
computation result is the confidence value for "fault between bus 3 and bus 4" greater than 
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the threshold. Instantaneous tripping signal is sent to breakers at bus 3 and bus 4 to trip the 
faulted portion of the system. If only one side of the line between bus 3 and 4 is affected by 
hidden failures, the backup function for the failed protection would have similar process. It is 
reasonable to believe that the proposed architecture and algorithms can be effectively applied 
to reduce the impact of hidden failures. Implementation of the algorithm in MATLAB 
environment is demonstrated in Chapter 5. 
3.7 Adaptive Autoreclosure 
It is well known that the majority of faults in overhead lines are temporary in nature 
(Blackburn 1998). Accordingly autoreclosure schemes are applied to transmission and 
distribution systems as an effort to maintain transfer power to the maximum extent. Both fast 
and delayed reclosing following fault clearing have positive effect on system stability and 
synchronism, thus preserving the continuity of supply and improving grid reliability (IEEE 
PSRC, 1992). 
However, autoreclosure practice can also pose problems towards equipment safety 
and system stability. Major threats come from the possibility of second shock by reclosing to 
a permanent fault or a temporary fault but before a sufficient time for fully de-ionizing the 
fault path. Since the present practice of automatic reclosure is essentially employing a "trial 
and error" approach without differentiating fault types and fault conditions, there is no 
control over the risk of second shock. Therefore autoreclosure schemes have been mostly 
used when temporary faults play an important role but the consequences of reclosing into a 
Confidence 
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0.2 
0 
0.7 
0.5 
Zonel Zone2 'apparent 
Figure 3.8 Example of tripping logic in a fuzzy distance relay 
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permanent fault is not prohibitive (Anderson, 1999). Thus in some utilities reclosing is not 
widely adopted in EHV transmission systems. 
Nevertheless, it is imaginable that with new techniques available to discriminate 
temporary faults and to determine the proper time to reclose, autoreclosure would be used 
more widely and efficiently. Furthermore, considering the possible existence of inadvertent 
relay operations, it is more sensible to apply reclosing to avoid unnecessary loss of system 
connectivity. The challenge, however, lies in how to differentiate a real fault or a false alarm 
This is where the intelligence of the relay comes into play in preserving the security of the 
system (Anderson, 1999). 
There is one more consideration in the issue of autoreclosure. It is the practice of 
three-phase tripping versus single-phase tripping. Three-phase tripping is more adopted in the 
North America, even for one -phase-to-ground faults. Although there are some EHV schemes 
having single-pole reclosing, it is not a dominant practice in the US. In other areas, such as 
China and Russia, single-phase tripping and reclosing is used for single-phase faults. 
Generally three-phase tripping is simple and safe, whereas single-phase tripping and 
reclosing enhances the system security (IEEE PSRC, 1992). 
In summary, the issues that an autoreclosure scheme needs to ascertain are whether to 
reclose the circuit breakers, which phase(s) to reclose and precisely when to reclose. New 
techniques, referred to as adaptive autoreclosure techniques, are developed to address these 
questions and are briefly introduced in the following text. 
• Distinguishing between permanent and transient faults 
The concept of adaptive reclosure was firstly studied in 1980s to distinguish between 
temporary and permanent faults for single-phase switching cases (Ge, Sui, & Xiao, 1989). 
The method is based on an analysis and comparison of coupling voltages in both steady and 
transient states on the opened phase during reclosing dead time, which is the period 
following the tripping operation. 
A number of approaches have followed to address this subject. One is Artificial 
Neural Network (ANN)-based scheme for single-phase adaptive reclosure. The circuit 
breaker control system is created on features extracted from the characteristic voltage 
waveforms that developed on the opened phase during the secondary arc period. It has been 
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observed that with many factors affecting these waveforms, e.g. line configuration, pre-fault 
loading, fault location, fault point on wave, source parameters, or even atmospheric 
conditions, the relationship between these factors and the voltage is very complex. The 
neural network is trained by sufficient data from fault simulation and can recognize certain 
situations to give a good reclosure decision The test results demonstrate the ability of the 
ANN approach to be used as an attractive and effective means of realizing an adaptive 
autoreclosure scheme (Fitton, Dunn, Aggarwal, Johns, & Bennett, 1996). 
Other than artificial intelligent methods, numerical approaches using high-frequency 
fault transient components have also been presented both in the spectral and time domain 
(Djuric & Terzija, 1995; Radojevic, Terzija, & Djuric, 2000). The faulted phase voltage is 
modeled as a serial connection of fault resistance and arc voltage. Line terminal voltage and 
current data are processed using the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) and arc voltage is 
estimated through Least Error Squares Technique. Moreover, Li et. al have introduced an 
approach in identifying arcing faults by processing high frequency current transient using the 
wavelet transform (Li, Dong, Bo, Chin, & Ge, 2001). 
Adaptive reclosure for three-phase switching has been hard to implement because the 
fault arc extinguishes soon after a three-phase tripping of the line. Some researchers found 
the solution from the power line carrier communication signals (Huang, Li, & Li, 2002). The 
transmission channel for carrier current restores quickly after the line tripping. Therefore the 
propagation of carrier current is affected by the fault spot, if still existing. By analyzing the 
high frequency signal produced by carrier current transmitter and its communication channel 
of carrier protection, fault characteristics can be identified. 
• Deciding the reclosing time 
The effectiveness in maintaining power system stability is largely determined by the 
speed with which autoreclosure can be achieved (Johns, Song, & Aggarwal, 1993). The 
present reclosure schemes usually adopt a fixed dead time before reclosing (Blackburn, 
1998). This is the simplest way and can be very inefficient. To avoid unsuccessful reclosure 
or unnecessarily long dead time, adaptively calculated dead time could contribute to the 
system stability drastically. 
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There are two parts of the time determination process involved. One is to precisely 
define the secondary arc extinction time in the case of transient faults. Some work in adaptive 
autoreclosure has introduced the measure of adjusting dead times according to arc extinction 
times (Sang-Pil, Chul-Hwan, Aggarwal, & Johns, 2001; Tuan, Hadj-Said, Sabonnadiere, & 
Feuillet, 2000). However, although the secondary arc extinction time provides a good 
indication of when to reclose, reclosure of the circuit breakers immediately following arc 
extinction will normally result in a re-strike of the fault. This is because a further finite time 
is required to allow the fault arc path to deionize fully, so that the transmission line may 
withstand the full system voltage on re-energization. It has been identified that the length of 
this additional delay period after secondary arc extinction is definite and does not vary with 
the line length, characteristic of fault or voltage level (Websper, Johns, Aggarwal, & Dunn, 
1995). Therefore the optimal reclosure time can be determined by applying this deionization 
time in conjunction with adaptive autoreclosure techniques. 
• The role of single-phase tripping and auto-reclosing 
Single-phase autoreclosure (SPAR) is quite extensively used in long-line applications 
in China and Europe. It involves tripping only the faulted phase for single-phase earth faults. 
SPAR takes advantage of the fact that the most frequent faults in overhead transmission lines 
are phase-to-ground unsymmetrical faults. The representative statistics show that the 
percentage of single-phase-to-ground faults would be 70% for HV and 93% for EHV/UHV 
lines (IEEE PSRC, 1992). 
Since only the faulted phase is tripped during the fault, approximately 50% of 
transmission capacity is still retained via the two healthy phases, the switching overvoltages 
and shaft torsional oscillations of thermal units are reduced. Other benefits of single-phase 
tripping and auto-reclosing include improving transient stability and system reliability, as 
well as cost effective (IEEE PSRC, 1992). From the industry experience tie practice of 
SPAR has redefined the optimal response to line fault. 
The effectiveness of single pole autoreclosure in wide area disturbances has been 
noticed. For example, the famous WECC 2 July 1996 outage was initiated by a transient Em­
phase fault at the Kinport-Jim bridge 345kV line. If single-phase tripping and reclosing was 
adopted, a successful B-phase reclosing may have avoided further cascading. Suggestions 
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have been made to revise NERC reliability criteria to accommodate single-phase tripping and 
autoreclosing to avoid cascading outages and raise the system stability level in real 
operational practice (Liu, 1998). 
• Distinguishing relay false operations from real faults 
The methods aforementioned for distinguishing between permanent and transient 
faults can also be applied to identify relay false operations. Furthermore, the author would 
suggest applying the "voting with real-time intelligent factors scheme" described in Section 
3.6 to determine the confidence level of the existence of a real fault. With information from 
all connected relays both before the tripping operation and afterwards, plus the system 
recommended reliability bias index, the adaptive relay is more likely to make better and 
informative reclosure decisions than under the traditional isolated conditions. 
In general, adaptive autoreclosure techniques can offer many advantages over 
conventional schemes in improving power system stability and reliability, adaptive 
autoreclosure leads to high percentage of high-speed successful reclosures after the optimum 
dead time, or no reclosure onto permanent faults. This, in turn contributes to reducing 
damaging shocks and voltage dips, longer circuit breaker life, better supply quality and 
stability, and faster sympathy trip response, etc. (Fitton & Gardiner, 1995; IEEE PSRC, 
1992). Therefore adaptive autoreclosure is considered a feature that adaptive wide area 
protection would encompass. 
In this chapter, a new concept on adaptive wide area protection for power system is 
proposed and various related topics are discussed. The architecture and algorithms are 
explored at the conceptual level, leaving practical design and validation to Chapter 5. 
Communication that is required to support this proposed adaptive wide area protection is 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4. COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS FOR 
ADAPTIVE WIDE AREA PROTECTION 
Communications have always been important in power system protection and control. 
Early protection systems have in fact included their own dedicated communication channels, 
such as power line carrier and microwave, which are considered as a part of the whole 
relaying scheme (Blackburn, 1998). 
It is obvious that high speed and reliable communication is necessary to realize the 
proposed adaptive protection scheme described in Chapter 3. For this reason, the 
communication systems that are currently available are briefly introduced and evaluated, 
with the intention of adoption some for utilization in the proposed protection design. 
In this chapter, communication media and protocols that are required for the proposed 
protection design are examined. The time needed for communication procedure in adaptive 
wide area protection is estimated. To meet the requirements of speed, reliability and 
intelligence for communication protocols, profiles of existing communication protocols are 
promoted. However, limitations of current protocols are identified and possible modifications 
are suggested. 
4.1 Transmission Media 
Telecommunication is the transfer of information across a distance. To support the 
transmission, there must be a transmitter, at least one receiver, and some physical medium in 
between There are a number of options in selecting the transmission technique. Basically a 
data transmission system can be either wired or wireless. That is, the signal is either guided 
through a transmission medium or unguided between antennas. In this section, major 
communication techniques are briefly reviewed. 
The electromagnetic spectrum of transmission media is shown in Fig. 4.1. According 
to Stallings (2000), when choosing a communication medium, the key concerns are 
maximum data rate and distance between repeaters. Hence, these parameters of mainstream 
transmission media are summarized and compared in Table 4.1 (Stallings, 2000). All data are 
for digital communications and the number may change over the time since new technologies 
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are emerging everyday. It is just to give the reader a rough feeling in comparison of the 
capacity and distance of popular transmission media. 
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Figure 4.1 Electromagnetic Spectrum for Telecommunications (Stallings, 2000) 
Table 4.1 Digital capacity and distance of transmission media 
LAN data 
rate (bps) 
WAN data 
rate (bps) 
repeater 
distance (km) 
Guided 
media 
(wire) 
Twisted pair 600 M 4M 1-3 
Coaxial cable 500 M 1-10 
Fiber optics 1G -IT 10-100 
Unguided 
media 
(wireless) 
Terrestrial 
Microwave 
N/A 50M 2-40 
Satellite Microwave N/A 36M-72M N/A 
4.1.1 Guided Transmission Media (Stallings, 2000) 
• Twisted-pair 
Twisted-pair is two independently insulated wires twisted around one another. One 
wire carries the signal while the other wire is grounded and absorbs signal interference. 
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Many of twisted-pair wires are usually bundled into cables. Twisted-pair cable is widely used 
by older telephone networks and modern local-area networks (LANs). It is cheap and easy to 
work with, yet susceptible to interference and noise. 
• Coaxial cable 
It is a type of wire that consists of a center wire surrounded by insulation and then a 
grounded shield of braided wire. The shield minimizes electrical and radio frequency 
interference. Coaxial cabling is the primary type of cabling used by the cable television 
industry and is also widely used for local computer networks. 
• Fiber optic cables 
This is a technology that uses glass (or plastic) threads (fibers) to transmit data. A 
fiber optic cable consists of a bundle of glass threads, each of which is capable of 
transmitting messages modulated onto light waves by laser or LED. Fiber optics has the 
following advantages over traditional metal communications lines, besides greater bandwidth 
and longer distance: 
1. Data can be transmitted digitally rather than analogically. 
2. Fiber optic cables are less susceptible than metal cables to interference due 
to its electromagnetic isolation 
3. Fiber optic cables are much thinner and lighter than metal wires. 
The main disadvantage of fiber optics is that the cables are expensive to install. In 
addition, they are more fragile than wires and are difficult to split. 
4.1.2 Wireless Transmission (Stallings, 2000) 
• Terrestrial microwave systems 
Microwave systems transmit voice and data through the atmosphere as high 
frequency radio waves. Use of a certain frequency generally requires Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) licensing. The focused beams of microwave are 
directional and cannot bend around corners or around the earth's curvature. They need direct 
line-of-sight so there must be an unobstructed view between the transmitter and the receiver 
at relay stations. Disruptions of the microwave usually occur due to heavy fog and rain. 
• Satellite microwave systems 
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It is a microwave system using the satellite as a relay station. The satellite contains 
many communications channels and receives both analog and digital signals from earth 
stations. Satellite receives signals on one frequency, amplifies or repeats and transmits 
signals on another frequency. 
• Broadcast radio 
The major difference between microwave and broadcast radio transmission is that the 
broadcast radio is omni-directional, having signal spreads in all directions and can be 
received by many antennas, while microwave is intended for point-to-point transmission 
only. In other words, the broadcast radio can transmit data to many destinations at the same 
time. This characteristic has limited the use of broadcast radio in power system protection 
and control due to security considerations. 
4.1.3 Comparison among Twisted Pair, Coaxial Cable, and Optical Fiber 
The coaxial cable has higher data rate and bandwidth than that of twisted pair. The 
repeater spacing of twisted pair and coaxial cable is similar. However, the fiber optics has 
superior performance compared with twisted pair and coaxial cable, both in bandwidth and 
the repeater spacing. When the environment is susceptible to electromagnetic interference, 
both twisted pair and coaxial cable may have reliability problem, where the fiber optics 
stands out due to no electrical coupling in the transmission mechanism. 
4.1.4 Comparison between Microwave and Optical Fiber 
When choosing from optics and microwave communication it is needed to consider 
the different characteristics of these two media. The bandwidth and repeater spacing 
parameters are compared in Table 4.1. Obviously fiber optics has the advantage in both 
parameters. For its physical condition, fiber optics is not affected by the electromagnetic 
interference and has higher security. However, fiber optics is possibly knocked down by a 
storm or it may be difficult to change the routing physically. On the other hand, the 
microwave is transmitted through the air therefore easier to be detected so its security is 
relatively low. But it is easier for it to change the configuration even to point-to-multipoint 
broadcast. 
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4.2 Estimation of Communication and Control Times 
The concept of adaptive protection as envisioned in Fig. 3.4 depends on the speed 
with which the adaptive relays can identify and analyze an emergency as well as the speed 
with which remedial control action can be effected. Therefore the proposed protection system 
must be supported by a fully developed, high-speed data communications system. Utilities 
are installing high speed LANs interconnecting all components in substations. Also optical 
fiber networks with appropriate protocols and dedicated links to connect the substations with 
central controllers are expected. Many utilities are already installing such networks, both for 
their internal use and to establish additional business providing communications services. 
The current time estimate for the total process of adaptive protection is shown in 
Table 4.2. It includes data collection, communication, and control action after fault initiation. 
Table 4.2 Estimated times for adaptive protection actions 
Activity Time Ref. 
Sensor processing 5 ms (Dutta & Dutta Gupta, 1992) 
Transmission of information to central controller 10 ms (Li, Yates, Doverspike, & 
Dongmei, 2001) 
Processing incoming message queue 10 ms (Li et al., 2001) 
Analysis and decision 100 ms (Faucon & Dousset, 1997) 
Transmission of control signal 10 ms (Li et al., 2001) 
Operation of local device 50 ms (Blackburn, 1998) 
Total 185 ms 
The time for sensors to process data and the time for devices to operate are well 
understood and documented in the literature (Dutta & Dutta Gupta, 1992; Blackburn, 1998). 
The times required for the other activities are more difficult to determine. The estimate of 
communication time is based on the assumption that utilities will have complete fiber optic 
networks available with dedicated channels provided as needed for high priority 
communication and control signals. Hence, for short messages, the communication time 
depends almost entirely on the propagation speed along fiber cables at 124,138 miles/sec. (Li 
et al., 2001). This estimate is based on a distance of 1000 miles plus some delay time for 
intermediate nodes (0.3 ms per node). Whether there is a node delay depends on the 
protocols used. The computation time for making control decisions varies greatly with the 
hardware and software. The estimate is consistent with that used by the EDF defense plan 
(Faucon & Dousset, 1997). The conclusion is that 200 ms should be adequate to accomplish 
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the data collection, communication, and control action after fault initiation. If the 
computation time is estimated as around 10ms (jCezunovic, et al., 1999), the total time 
needed is less than 100ms. 
For preventive control, this speed is adequate. For emergency control, the proposed 
adaptive relays are expected to be faster than conventional backup relays. The normal 
operational requirement of several milliseconds for primary protection functions can still be 
met. Furthermore, the back-up functions in the proposed scheme can provide faster and more 
appropriate decisions under different operating conditions. 
4.3 Requirements for Intelligence 
More than speed issues discussed above, the proposed design of protection systems 
needs sophisticated consideration of communication protocol improvements. Similar to 
established protection system architecture, there are overlaps among sets of breakers 
controlled by each relay. This is the basic concept of redundancy for reliable protective 
operation. Therefore, coordination among relays is needed. An advantage of the proposed 
architecture over the existing one is that all relays are networked so utilizing proper 
communication for coordination is possible and flexible. Previously, each relay had to 
independently apply different duration of time delays, with the only intention of waiting for 
other relays' possible operation. Yet for adaptive relays, more knowledge of data from other 
relays provides necessary information for a delay-free coordination. To perform effective 
coordination through communications, the protocol is expected to be high-speed, reliable, 
fault-tolerant, and intelligence-enabled. It is to be accomplished for both local and wide area 
communications. 
The communication protocols require intelligence because the purpose of the 
communication is no longer pure data gathering. More structured functions are expected 
from communication procedures. For example, in the application of generators shifting 
power output to relieve line overloading, a central strategy sends out query messages to get 
all related generators and load information for negotiation. After a certain number of 
negotiation iterations, generator shifting actions are taken at different places and line loads 
are correspondingly reduced. This is a typical preventive control case, since a local 
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overloading may potentially lead to a large-area disturbance and unintentional islanding as it 
happened in the recent blackout in the U.S. on August 14, 2003 (U.S./Canada Power Outage 
Task Force, 2003). In such a case the communication protocol should enable flexible data 
structure, negotiation functions, and intelligent decisions for effective control and protection 
of the system. 
To support high-performance intelligent relay operations over the network, legacy 
communication protocols (Modbus, DNP3.0, and IEC 870-5) may not be well suited to 
emerging practices. Three main features need to be changed: 
• Legacy protocols are points-list oriented, which means they have fixed data 
format and possess a heavy documentation burden. As a contrast, object-oriented 
protocols are self-descriptive thus expandable, making intelligent applications 
possible. 
• Legacy protocols are optimized for slow serial data connections due to the history 
and technology confinements. Nowadays, wide bandwidth data transfer 
necessitates high-performance LAN and WAN protocols. 
• Legacy protocols are based on the assumption of master-slave architecture. But 
the information exchange among relays calls for peer-to-peer communication 
protocols, which becomes the key function in the proposed architecture. 
4.4 Features and Discussion of UCA™ 
With the background of the emerging need for developing open communication 
architecture for IED communication in substations, EPRI launched the Utility 
Communication Architecture (UCA™) project in 1986 (IEEE, 1999; IEEE PSRC, 2003). It 
is a standards-based approach to utility communications. The objective of the project was to 
meet the requirements of a wide range of utility performance criteria, while maintaining 
consistency at the device and data levels to reduce wide-scale integration costs. 
As stated in sections 4.2 and 4.3, the requirement of the proposed adaptive protection 
to the communication system is stringent in speed, reliability and intelligence. It is obvious 
that the legacy communication protocols in power system protection and control are not able 
to meet the requirement. Therefore UCA™ is briefly introduced in this section and the 
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possibility of adopting it for adaptive wide area protection system is evaluated. This section 
does not have the intent to give a whole picture ofUCA™. Instead, only relay-related topics 
are discussed. The references (IEEE, 1999; IEEE PSRC, 2003) provide a better overview and 
more details about UCA™. 
In the past several years, UCA™ has been adopted as an international standard of 
IEC 61850. The technical specifications of each version of UCA™ represent a consensus of 
expert opinion at the time of publication However, this work is still being continued through 
the standardization process by a number of organizations and modifications are very likely. 
UCA™ 2.0 was developed as the result of several pilot projects launched in 1993 and 
1994 (IEEE, 1999). Within the UCA™ 2.0 framework, 
• Profiles are recommended with suites of Open System Interconnection (OSI) 
layered protocols. Within each profile, a set of commercially available high-speed 
communication protocols is adopted. 
• The definition of the data and control functions made available by the device is 
known as the device object model. The standardized device data and methods 
models are defined in Generic Object Models for Substation and Feeder 
Equipment (GOMSFE), which describes the format, representation, and meaning 
of utility data. The self-descriptive object models in GOMSFE assure device 
interoperability. 
• The device models make use of a set of Common Application Service Models 
(CASM) to describe the communication behavior of the devices. A standard 
mapping of these services onto the UCA application layer protocol, 
Manufacturing Message Specifications (MMS), when used in conjunction with 
the device models, completely specifies the detailed interoperable structure for 
utility field devices. 
The major benefits of employing UCA are briefly summarized: 
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Multi-vendor interoperability: The use of standard device- service-protocol 
mapping completely specifies the detailed interoperable structure and open data 
access for utility field devices. 
Self-description of devices: detailed object-orientated device models were 
developed to support the basic functionality of each device class. The use of 
named variables in device models, as opposed to anonymous point lists in legacy 
protocols, greatly reduces planning, commissioning, documentation costs, and 
installation problems. Hence validation of the mapping of SCADA database 
entries with field device values becomes extremely simple. 
Independent functional structure: layered approach enables the isolation of device 
models from the underlying network protocol, and the ability of utilities to choose 
the media/link combination that best meets their cost/benefit range. 
Saves 40% capital costs and 15%-30% recurring costs (IEEE PSRC, 2003): the 
savings in costs are through application of one set of common standards and ease 
of maintenance. 
Benefits of the Ethernet LAN which is within UCA profiles: 
o reduction of conventional wiring 
o parallel operation 
o shared resources 
o shared redundancy 
o availability of off-the-shelf diagnostics and network management products 
Expandability: The devices hardware and applications are free from technical 
obsolescence and can expand incrementally. Both utility and vendors can 
incorporate future communications innovations while maintaining their existing 
implementations. 
Security: UCA allows secure access by "foreign" utilities to specific systems and 
customers, while keeping them isolated from the details of the network and device 
infrastructure. 
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Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) is one of the basic global models 
defined in GOMSFE for reporting relay IED input and output signals. In the following 
subsections, GOOSE functions and performance are evaluated for adoption in the proposed 
adaptive protection system. 
4.4.1 Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) 
It is the development of IED that results in the possibility of direct network access to 
field devices, as well as more processing being performed at the end device. In contrast to the 
conventional master/slave communication, there emerges the need for arbitrary pairs of 
IEDs, or peers, to manage communication mutual information. GOOSE is designed to 
address peer-to-peer communications issues of protective relay IEDs. In general, this type of 
communications 
• Is mission sensitive and time critical, 
• Supports variable time contact closures, and 
• Must be highly reliable. 
Accordingly the operation mechanism of GOOSE is designed as follows: 
• Distributed decision making: the decision of the appropriate action to GOOSE 
messages, and the action to take should a message time out due to a 
communication failure, are determined by local intelligence in the IED receiving 
the GOOSE message. 
• Multicast: The target speed of UCA time-critical messages is identified as 4 ms 
for simple binary state information. To meet the stringent time requirement for 
GOOSE messages, the communication mode of multicast is chosen for sending 
the same message to multiple devices simultaneously. The work model is known 
as "publisher/subscriber", in which sending device publishes the message and any 
device interested in is programmed to subscribe to it. 
• Repeated and unacknowledged transmission: IEDs are required to initiate a 
GOOSE message whenever the status changes. As long as the output is stable the 
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same message keeps retransmitting to the network. The retransmission intervals 
range from several milliseconds to one minute and can be configured. 
• Time to live ("hold time"): the message (status) will expire after the hold time 
expires, unless the same status message is repeated or a new message is received. 
• IED status reporting: To ensure that all associated IEDs will know the current 
status of their peers, the status of each IED is transmitted in the following way: 
o A newly activated IED will send current status as an initial GOOSE. 
o Any IED can request a specific IED's status at any time. 
o All IEDs will send out their status message on a periodic basis. 
Table 4.3 Common components required for GOOSE 
Name Description DataType4 
Sending IED Unique name of the device sending IED IDENT 
t Time stamp of the GOOSE message BTIME6 
SqNum Message sequence number INT16U 
header StNum Event sequence number INT16U 
HoldTim Hold time is the time that a particular message is held before it is 
canceled 
INT16U 
BackTim Back time is the time since the last event INT16U 
PhsID Identifies faulted phases INT16U 
DNA Protection Dynamic Network Announcement5 BSTR64 
UserSt User status is a group of 128 bit pairs defined by the utility or vendor BSTR256 
The format of the GOOSE message is standardized in UCA 2.0. Table 4.3 includes 
the common components used to facilitate the GOOSE class object. 
4 The UCA standard data types are defined as following (IEEE, 1999): 
IDENT: VSTR65, identifies a Data Object or subcomponent of a Data Object within the scope 
of the server 
VSTRn: Printable ASCII text string—1 to n characters 
BTIME6 Number of ms sincc midnight and days since 1 January 1984 - 6 Octets 
INT16U Unsigned integer—16 bits 
BSTRn: Bit string—"n" bits 
5 Protection DNA is a single 64-bit message that conveys all required protection scheme information regarding 
an individual IED. In this message each bit pair is uniquely assigned to one feature of the protection scheme; the 
four states corresponding to the bit pair values are defined as a standard. By this means protection DNA in a 
GOOSE message reports the status of all components in the IED to its peers per the enrollment list. 
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4.4.2 PFiVe /frea GOO&E 
The function of WAG is time-critical communication over an extensive area, for 
example, relay transfer tripping. Moreover, WAG is intended to form a foundation for "next 
generation power system control" (IEEE PSRC, 2003). Therefore the performance in speed 
and traffic control is of vital importance. In a wide area network, multicast GOOSE messages 
are bridged rather than routed among substations for the sake of speed. Benchmark tests 
show that Ethernet bridging over Synchronous Optical NETwork (SONET) only adds 1ms to 
the propagation timing (IEEE PSRC, 2003). Thus the total time delay of a GOOSE message 
would include 4 ms of GOOSE time, 1ms of bridging time plus the fiber delay, which is 
typically 5 ps/km. This means that a GOOSE message can be sent over 1000 km in 10 ms. 
This communication delay represents the best that can be achieved based on present day 
techniques. It is acceptable for today's remote protection and control requirement as long as 
the traffic load is under control. However, concerns for WAG performance due to message 
clogging do exist and will be discussed in the following subsection. 
4.4.3 Limitations and Modifications 
GOOSE of UCA 2.0 meets most of the requirements of the proposed adaptive 
protection for communication architecture. However, there is still concern with the practical 
use of GOOSE in the future. 
4.4.3.1 Object Model Considerations 
GOOSE is based upon the asynchronous reporting of an IED's outputs status to other 
peer IEDs (IEEE, 1999). The design principle is such that the associated IEDs receiving the 
message use the information contained therein to determine what the appropriate protection 
response is for the given state. Thus the status of each IED contributes to the decision­
making of enrolled peer IEDs and information is shared. 
The protection Dynamic Network Announcement (DNA) bit pairs of GOOSE were 
originally designed to facilitate connection among devices through the definition of 
"standard" bits. In UCA 2.0, there are 26 bit pairs defined in the 64-bit protection DNA for 
26 identified features of a protection scheme, e.g. the 2nd bit pair is assigned to the status of 
"lock out" while the 6th bit pair is assigned to the status of "send transfer trip" (IEEE, 1999). 
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However, the ability of today's IED to provide multiple component protection made such 
standard assignments limiting. On one hand, one bit pair, or four values for different states of 
each feature was designed for digital output of relays and might be inadequate in the 
foreseeable future. The data structure of next generation IEDs feature could be more complex 
than simple digital signals. It could be the protection device status with its corresponding 
"confidence level" as proposed in Section 3.6. Therefore the communication standard should 
not limit itself to digital value exclusively. On the other hand, even if a specific IED does not 
have a certain feature, it is standardized to fill every bit of the reporting message. This leads 
to waste of both communication bandwidth and processing time. The truth is, the definition 
of GOOSE is wrapping a point-list in a self-descriptive message. 
The limitation has been realized soon after the publication of UCA 2.0. As a result, 
the DNA bits now have become user-definable (IEEE PSRC, 2003). However, 
interoperability would be infeasible if DNA bits are totally user defined. If protocol 
converters are needed for GOOSE communication, UCA would be a practically vain effort in 
communication standardization. Instead of loosing control of the standardization process, a 
self-descriptive object-oriented data model would solve the problems of both expandability 
and interoperability. 
The author proposes a GOOSE DNA structure to include an additional DNA header 
for each feature state reported in the GOOSE message. The DNA header is of the data type of 
INT16U. Within this DNA header the first 12 bits are for the identification number of relay 
features, which are defined in the standard, e.g. 245 (000011110101) can be defined as the 
"fault detection with fuzzy factor" as proposed in Section 3.6. The DNA header has the 
capacity of 4096 protection scheme features. The remaining 4 bits in the header are to 
indicate the length in bit of the state value that follows. Thus the maximum length of the 
DNA payload is 16 bits, or maximum of 65536 states. This length indicator enables variable 
length of states for different protection features, which is a must for complex object models. 
The principle of DNA header is that the definition of each feature identification number, its 
corresponding state format and meaning are standard and publicized among users and 
vendors. Table 3.12 gives an example of a part of the DNA in a GOOSE message. 
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Table 4.4 A part of the protection DNA in a GOOSE message reflecting one feature of the protection 
scheme 
DNA header payload 
000011110101 0010 1 0 1 
Identification number of a 
specific protection feature: fault 
detection with fuzzy factor 
3 bits 
following 
the state format and meaning defined: 
1: true for "in-zone fault"; 
01: with a "confidence level" of 0.5 
The advantages of the proposed data model include enabling transferring complex 
data objects without loosing interpretability, flexibility in message length so less waste in 
bandwidth. In the mean time, adding the DNA header would slightly increase the 
communication overhead. Transferring a GOOSE message of standard 26 bit pairs without 
the optional user status part, as defined in UCA 2.0, involves a payload ratio6 of 7% within 
the application layer protocol. While the same information transferred as the proposed model 
involves a payload ratio of 5%. The decrease in the percentage of useful data transferred is 
not significant. 
4.4.3.2 Performance Considerations 
When the communications among IEDs involve reporting time-critical messages, the 
real-time response speed requirement could be very critical, e.g. 2 ms for one-way transfer on 
substation LAN (McDonald, Câceres, Borlase, & Janssen, 1998). Simulations and 
benchmark testing during earlier phases of the Substation Initiative Demonstration Project 
have proved that 100 Mbps Fast Ethernet and/or switched Ethernet would meet requirements 
for protection commands over the substation LAN (IEEE PSRC, 2003). The testing was 
carried out with typical IED counts under disaster overload conditions caused by 
simultaneous faults. The results show that Ethernet with an intelligent switcher is at least as 
fast as legacy hardwired configuration under different loading scenarios and with multiple 
events in parallel. It is also promising that the development of Gigabit Ethernet and 10 
Gigabit Ethernet would facilitate higher speed communication, by which the stringent 
protection and control time requirements are becoming easier to meet. 
6 For the purpose of comparing two object models difference in the DNA data block, the payload ratio is 
calculated as the ratio of DNA state information block over overall message including headers, although 
actually part of the information in the header can be considered as payload as well. 
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On the other hand, the concern about the network performance still exists. 
Theoretically, to ensure communications have the speed so that relays can derive fault 
isolation decisions, the response times for data transfer must be deterministic and repeatable. 
Some protocols have deterministic time delay, e.g. token ring (IEEE 802.5), token bus (IEEE 
802.4). But all token protocols have too much overhead for a high-speed network. 
Meanwhile, the most popular high-speed LAN configurations, 10M Ethernet (IEEE 802.3) 
and 100M Ethernet (IEEE 802.3u, y), which are among UCA profiles, are not protocols with 
deterministic delay. The mechanism of collision detection has no guarantee to predict data 
transfer delay. So a shared medium network is associated with variable communications 
latency. The "best effort" protocol quality of service (QOS) lacks message arrival and 
processing assurance. In addition, Ethernet does not support priority data transfer. 
Coexistence of mission-critical control signals with non-mission-critical data causes more 
variation in the QOS. And the repeated GOOSE messages add even more challenges to the 
network load and device processing. In practice if no effective congestion control mechanism 
is in action to manage the network traffic, unacceptable transmission delay or even packet 
loss are potential risks in the multicast GOOSE transmission. 
UCA has made major efforts in assuring network performance and making up for the 
holes in the service. In order to ensure consistent and repeatable data delivery times, 
collisions are to be eliminated. UCA 2.0 provides two options for LAN connection: shared 
hub and switch. Network collision problems can be solved to some degree with switches. To 
further minimize collisions among messages, the refresh interval between the IED repeat 
messages is parameterized and randomized. Furthermore, hardware message filtering and 
prioritization in each IED can address device overload concerns by giving priority to 
mission-critical messages. Each receiving IED can use back time to set appropriate local 
times associated with the original state even if intervening messages were lost. 
Still it is realized that caution must be taken in device design for UCA GOOSE to be 
effective as a method to send mission-critical data throughout the network (IEEE PSRC, 
2003). All layers of all devices on the network must make sure that their functioning and 
malfunctioning will not overload the network or device buffers and delay the control 
messages. 
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The performance of GOOSE messages, in particular WAG, is susceptible to possible 
failures in traffic control. It is more of a problem for WAN communications because all 
WAG messages are sent to the WAN without filtering. To aggravate the situation, TCP/IP, 
which is recommended by UCA, does not support priority data transfer. The best effort data 
transfer is too primitive for protection applications since it leads to unreliable transfer and 
unpredictable turnaround delay. Only dedicated link/connection has the possibility to fulfill 
requirements raised by wide area protection and control applications. So far the only resort of 
avoiding clogging the network is by "taking caution" in all implementation of WAG schemes 
not to send too many GOOSE messages. This sounds dangerous because only one 
malfunctioning or malicious device without this required caution is enough to paralyze the 
entire wide area network. Even without considering the extreme cases, eliminating non­
essential GOOSE traffic would be a challenge in the wide area network. Hence, guarding-
devices for network management or built-in mechanism of the protocol is needed to ensure 
the performance of WAG. In the future, the solution might be UCA adopting other high 
speed communication protocols that guarantees deterministic time delay. 
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CHAPTER 5. ADAPTIVE PROTECTION FOR ENHANCING 
In this chapter, several cases are studied to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
proposed relaying concept in enhancing system security. Transient simulation is conducted 
on a 179-bus test system for the purpose of validation of the adaptive protection scheme. The 
detailed decision-making algorithms are simulated in two examples to show the protection 
system achieving the balance between dependability and security. 
The 179-bus test system used in these study cases is based on the interconnection in 
the western United States shown in Fig. 5.1. It is displayed on a background that outlines the 
represented geographical area. Compared to the actual system, this test system uses many 
equivalents. While the names of actual substations are used, it is cautioned that the system 
operation discussed here does not necessarily represent the actual system behavior. 
SYSTEM SECURITY 
5.1 Test System 
C 
mm 
Figure 5.1 A 179-bus Test System 
69 
The base case for the study has the generation of 61,411 MW and 12,330 Mvar that 
corresponds to a high summer peak. During such times, there is a heavy north to south flow 
through the area along the left of the system that is carried by both the Pacific DC Intertie 
(not shown in the figure) and parallel AC circuits (circled in the dashed oval). The focus has 
been on this region in developing examples of system problems that would result from relay 
operations. 
A detail of the test system, consisting of the portion of Fig. 5.1 inside the dashed oval, 
is shown in Fig. 5.2. This segment consists of the high voltage AC system that is parallel to 
the Pacific DC Intertie and is a critical portion of the system during high loading. Faults that 
result in the loss of multiple circuits here lead to instabilities affecting large segments of the 
western system. The simulations have been performed using ETMSP from the PSAPAC 5.0 
software package supplied by EPRI. 
5.2 Examples of Preventive Adaptive Protection 
In this section, three examples are provided to show how altering the behavior of the 
protection system in a preventive mode can meet the grid requirement. The adaptive 
protection shifts to a more "defensive" posture when the system is deemed vulnerable. Two 
of these examples involve protection unnecessary operations. Unnecessary relay operations 
frequently result from hidden failures. It is presumed that regardless of how much effort is 
expended to test the protection system to ensure that it will operate properly, some hidden 
failures are inevitable. Hence adaptive behavior of the protection system to reduce the impact 
of such failures is desirable. 
5.2.1 Example 1 - Blocking Sympathy Trip 
Consider a three-phase permanent fault on line 83-114(1) near bus 83 as shown in Fig. 
5.2. Normal operation of the protection system would clear both ends of the line using 
current differential relaying or instantaneous Zone 1 operation at bus 83 and a transfer trip 
signal to bus 114. The resulting transient is stable. 
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Figure 5.2 A critical portion of the test system 
One type of hidden failures identified in the literature (Phadke et al. 1995) occurs in 
transfer trip systems involving directional-comparison blocking. If such a system were 
employed here, the relays in the unfaulted parallel circuit 83-114(2) would see the fault but 
would be inhibited from tripping by the blocking signal. However, if a hidden failure were to 
occur in this blocking system, the parallel circuit 83-114(2) would trip as well. The loss of 
both of these circuits results in an unstable, cascading transient in which 14 generators have 
tripped in 4.28 seconds due to loss of synchronism. The resulting blackout extends over most 
of the southwestern United States. 
This instability is illustrated in Fig. 5.3 where the test region of Fig. 5.1 is represented 
by a surface. The elevation of points on that surface represents angular differences in 
generation near those points. All values are smoothed to create a continuum. The shape of the 
surface in the figure indicates that all generators in the southwest (the dark region) are 
tripped off as a result of the system instability. 
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Figure 5.3 Generator angle contour of unstable system without adaptive protection 
It is hypothesized that a preventive adaptive protection system might combat this 
situation. With knowledge that the system is vulnerable to such failures during periods of 
high loading, the system could decide to deactivate the transfer trip system during such times 
and rely on zone 2 relaying to clear the far end of the faulted line. The result is still stable 
although with higher amplitude transients in generator angles. Fig. 5.4 displays the contour of 
angle differences for this scenario, which is stable. Fig. 5.5 illustrates the motion of the angle 
of the generator at bus 112 in the normal case where there is no hidden failure in the 
protection system, and both ends of the line are cleared in 50 ms, with the adaptive case 
where the near end is cleared in 50 ms and the far end in 350 ms. As expected, the angle 
oscillations are larger in the adaptive case but an instability has been avoided in the event of 
the hidden failure hypothesized above. With an adaptive protection system like that 
suggested in Fig. 3.4, such a change in relaying strategy could be implemented quickly 
whenever the system vulnerability is judged to be too high. 
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Figure 5.4 Generator angle contour of stable system due to adaptive protection 
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Figure 5.5 Generator angle transient at bus 112 
5.2.2 Example 2 - Avoiding Emergency under Heavy Load 
When the system is stressed, actions taken by protective relays could result in severe 
consequences even if these actions are suitable for normal operating conditions. Consider the 
Critical Clearing Time (CCT) of a three-phase fault on the second line between John Day and 
Grizzly, 76-82(2), at a point 25% from John Day (Fig. 5.2). In this portion of the Pacific AC 
Intertie, three parallel 500-kV transmission lines carry the north-south flows in parallel with 
the DC intertie. 
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In Table 5.1, a uniform system real load increase of 1.5% results in a line flow 
increase of 56% at 76-82(2). The CCT becomes impractically short (<50 ms) since a fast 
circuit breaker needs 50-70 ms to open (Blackburn, 1998). 
Table 5.1 System sensitivity to load levels 
Pre-fault line 
flow through 
76-82 (2) 
Line 76-82 (2) 
CCT System behavior 
Base case 864 MW 160 ms Stable 
1.5% increase in system P 
1,349 MW <50 ms 
Severe oscillations on 
parallel line (1) &(3), up 
to 2 GW per line 
One solution to this difficulty is to extend the CCT by shedding load immediately 
after the fault. Simulation shows that, by simultaneously shedding 2% of system P and 
clearing the faulted line, the CCT is greater than 120 ms, which is a practical operating time. 
This load-shedding scheme is necessary only for heavily loaded conditions. Therefore the 
adaptive protection system could be switched to a preventive mode with a load-shedding 
scheme armed when this stressed system condition is detected. 
5.2.3 Example 3 - Short Term Overloading 
This example again considers a fault on line 76-82(2) with system loading as in the 
base case. If a hidden failure were to exist on line 76-82(1), such as a failure of a directional 
relay or zone 2 delay timer, the fault could trip both circuits leaving only line 76-82(3) in 
service. Specifically, with all lines in service, the current in line 76-82(3) is 0.5 kA. But the 
current increases to a steady state of 2.3 kA, following a transient peak of 3.5 kA, if the other 
two lines are out. This third line may trip on overload resulting in system islanding if its 
relays were not set to anticipate this eventuality. Similar events happened many times in 
history (NERC, 2003). 
Preventive adaptive protection can be employed to avoid such a catastrophe by 
modifying relay settings in advance. The triggering factor would be the heavy loading 
condition. If the relays are reset to allow a transient peak of 3.5 kA for 2.5 seconds and a 
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steady state current of 2.3 kA which is below the 500kV line thermal limit7, the system will 
remain stable. That is, when heavy loading occurs, the adaptive protection scheme could 
switch to higher overload current and longer overload tripping delay settings to maintain 
system stability during emergencies. 
Another solution would be having responsive mechanism in the adaptive relaying. By 
incorporating the real-time information of both load level and topology, the relay decision­
making procedure at line 76-82(3) can override the normal settings to hold up higher and 
longer transient and load current. The details of algorithms implementation of this example is 
shown in Section 5.4. 
In summary, examples 1, 2, and 3 are simple illustrations of how the system of Fig. 
3.4 can lead to a more defensive protection system in times of stress and vulnerability. In 
each case, the control available within the substation and central controllers, coupled with 
high-speed communication and computer controlled switching devices allow new control 
logic to be implemented. This new logic adjusts the protection system behavior prior to a 
disturbance to avoid an otherwise catastrophic failure. 
5.3 Examples of Emergency Adaptive Protection 
The system of Fig. 3.4 would be used in an emergency mode as well as in a 
preventive mode. That is, if the communication and control operations can be accomplished 
rapidly enough, it would be possible for the protection system to respond to an emergency by 
analyzing the problem and operating the appropriate protection components to avoid a 
catastrophic failure. In Section 4.2 it was estimated that the time required for detecting a 
problem, analyzing that problem and executing the appropriate control is on the order of 
100~200 ms. The available time is determined for executing the proper control in different 
scenarios as shown in the examples below. 
7 The actual current-temperature relationship of bare overhead lines can be calculated given the weather 
conditions (IEEE 1993). The maximum allowable conductor temperature is normally selected so as to limit 
either conductor loss of strength due to the annealing of aluminum or to maintain adequate ground clearance. 
When these effects are considered, it is common to use a higher maximum allowable conductor temperature for 
transient thermal rating calculations than for steady-state thermal rating calculations. For fault calculations, the 
maximum allowable temperature is normally close to the melting point of the conductor material (Walker et al., 
1982). 
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The portion of the system in Fig. 5.2, which is the most sensitive to failures, is 
repeated as Fig. 5.6 with specific breakers indicated. All examples concern a permanent 
three-phase fault between Malin, bus 83, and Summer, bus 86, at a point 10% from Summer 
as shown in Fig. 5.6. Allowing for breaker actuation time, normal relay action would clear 
both ends of the line with breakers A and B within about 50 ms. The cases considered 
involve a failure in the transfer trip system so that breaker B at Malin, 83, fails to clear that 
end of the line. With this failure of B, the system will resort to a backup-relaying scheme. 
Thus it is likely that all lines at Malin would trip using zone 2 of distance relays8. As a result, 
breakers C, D, E, F, and G would all open in 250-350 ms, depending on the relay time delay 
and breaker actuation time. This breaker action disrupts the entire AC corridor and, for this 
heavily loaded base case, the system is unstable and rapidly loosing synchronism. 
Three examples in this section will show how the adaptive protection system of Fig. 
3.4 can avoid this instability. Each relies on rapidly gathering information on line flows and 
breaker status from the Malin and all neighboring substations. Then the adaptive relays 
Figure 5.6 A critical portion of the test system with breaker identities shown. 
8 All six lines are assumed to be connected to a single bus section. Other bus configurations may behave 
differently. 
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identify the problem and take the remedial action described in the example. In all cases the 
speed required of the adaptive protection system is studied. That is, how much is enough 
time for the protection system to respond to the event before the system becomes unstable 
and the opportunity to avoid catastrophic failure is lost. Hence, for each example, the 
maximum time available is found for the remedial action to be accomplished, a time that 
depends on system loading and event sequence. 
5.3.1 Example 4 -Recovery through Reclosure 
The circuit breaker controllers must analyze the information available on the fault to 
identify the corrective action required. This mechanism can be realized in a centralized 
manner at the control center or distributed in each adaptive relay. In the centralized approach 
the Central Controller collects information from the affected substations through high-speed 
communications. The measurement of CTs on the six lines at Malin would be able to detect 
which line is carrying the major fault current out of the bus. If there were doubt, voltage and 
current information from the neighboring buses could be compared to identify the faulted 
line. Additional information would be available from a sequence of events recorder detecting 
the timing of breaker A relative to the others. Assuming breaker B is operational, the 
remedial action is to open breaker B and reclose the breakers on the five unfaulted lines. 
Such a group of remedial action commands are sent again through the communication 
channels that connect the substations and the control center. Thus the system recovers 
through proper reclosure actions. The distributed approach requires all adaptive relays at 
these six lines connected to the same network so they can share information in a peer-to-peer 
manner. By exchanging the measurement data and performing proper analysis built in each 
relay, the same set of decisions can be reached by each adaptive relay individually. 
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Figure 5.7 The time available for remedial actions 
The time available for this corrective action to maintain synchronism is examined 
through simulation. The lower set of data points, labeled "Example 4" of Fig. 5.7 summarizes 
the results for 8 cases, each at different load levels identified by the change from the base 
case. The base case represents the already heavily loaded system described before. In fact, a 
10% increase in system loads leads to a failure of the power flow to converge. Hence the 
cases from a 5% increase down to a 30% decrease from the base case are explored. All load 
adjustments are applied uniformly at all load buses. The time available between the 
occurrence of the fault and the necessary reclosure action varies between 360 and 830ms. 
The results show that even for heavy loading conditions the time available for adaptive 
protection to take remedial actions is adequate. The only concern is the proper coordination 
between the adaptive controller and traditional backup relays. This issue is addressed in the 
following example. 
5.3.2 Example 5 - Adaptive Backup Relaying 
The relaying failure scenario of this example is the same as that of Example 4. The 
differences are in the response of the protection system. Specifically, all traditional back up 
relaying is assumed to be overridden by adaptive back relaying. The practical approach can 
be having the Central Controller supervising and managing traditional relays, blocking if 
necessary, or replacing traditional relays with adaptive relays as backup. Same as in Example 
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4, breaker A opens in 50ms, because the primary functions operate instantaneously. Breaker 
B fails to operate due to the fault detector failure. In the centralized setup, Zone 2 in 
traditional backup relaying is blocked or delayed by the Central Controller so the other lines 
at Malin remain energized. In the distributed setup, each adaptive relay at the five unfaulted 
lines reaches the no-tripping decision based on information collected over the wide area. 
Upon assessing the status of the system, breaker B is opened either by the Central Controller 
command or the adaptive relay at breaker B, without any disruption of the other lines. This 
assessment depends on information from all connected relays sensing the fault and 
appropriate logic. The logic would include algorithms that can incorporate data uncertainty 
and incompleteness such as voting schemes with fuzzy techniques. With modern 
computation and communication technology, this decision process takes no more time than a 
normal backup relay. The implementation of this procedure is simulated in Section 5.4. 
The upper set of data points in Fig. 5.7, labeled "Example 5", indicates the time 
available for this adaptive backup relaying action for different system loads. The system is 
stable even if breaker B remains closed for loads that are 20% less than the base case. Of 
course, the fault currents are of concern and breaker B would be opened as quickly as the 
adaptive protection system could manage. The times displayed in Fig.4.7 represent the 
maximum time available for system stability. The results show that the time available is 
even more than that of the corresponding conditions in Example 4. 
5.3.3 Example 6 - The Effect of a Temporary Reduction of Power Flow 
In Example 4, where breakers C through G must be reclosed and breaker B opened, 
the time available for remedial action is quite short for high load levels. Even though the time 
available is longer than 200 ms, which is estimated to be required, it is to be explored 
whether the available time could be extended by temporarily reducing the flow through the 
affected lines. Since this portion of the Western U.S. system is parallel to the Pacific DC 
Intertie, it is possible shifting some load rapidly to that system, perhaps very temporarily. 
Indeed, the DC intertie is not used for such purposes and such a shift may be inappropriate 
for various operational reasons. However, other mechanisms for flow reduction may be 
possible since the shift can be very temporary if maintaining synchronism is the only concern. 
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For example, it may be possible to divert flow through some other part of the system or even 
shed some load for a brief period. 
The Pacific DC Intertie (PDCI) connects the Cellio Station, bus 71, with the Sylmar 
Station in the Los Angles area, spanning a distance of 1,361 km. Fig. 5.6 shows the terminal 
at bus 71 but the Sylmar Station is outside the area shown. While studying the controls for 
power flow on this line is beyond the scope of this research work, it is believed that flow can 
be altered very rapidly as is the case in other electronic controls. 
Fig. 5.8 plots the time available when the system is loaded as in the base case and the 
DC flow is increased by 1000, 2000, or 3000 MW. The available time increases from 360 ms 
in the base case to 430 ms for a 3000 MW increase in DC flow. In these studies, it is assumed 
that the flow diversion occurred at the same time as the remedial switching action. That is, in 
the case where the DC flow was increased by 2000 MW, the system could wait a maximum 
of 410 ms to divert that flow and accomplish the breaker switching. 
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Figure 5.8 The time available for remedial actions after changing of HVDC flow 
It was also studied how rapidly the DC flow could be restored to its original value and 
maintain synchronism. Fig. 5 .9 illustrates the result for the case of a 2000 MW transfer to the 
DC line for the base case as well as 5% changes above and below the base case. The lower 
data points are a repeat of the result in Example 4 with no load diversion. The middle data 
points are the time available when there is a 2000 MW diversion and the upper data points 
• 
• 
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identify the minimum time, from the time of the fault that the dc flow can be returned to its 
initial value. 
For example, when the loading is 5% above the base case, the available time is 
increased to 410 ms providing the DC flow is also increased by 2000 MW at that same time. 
That is, the DC flow increase gains 50 ms before action is required and the flow need be 
maintained for only an additional 440 ms or until 850 ms from the time of the fault. 
Again, it is not clear that such operation is feasible on the present DC system or any 
other but it illustrates some of the important interactions of the system components during 
faults. It is known that the FOCI is capable of transmitting up to 3100 MW in normal 
operation and 3650 MW for ten-minutes (Elliott, Lavier, Kuehn, & Kuechler, 1999). 
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Figure 5.9 Time available for remedial action after increasing DC flow by 2000 MW 
5.4 Algorithms Implementation 
The examples provided in this section are to implement the internal logic of adaptive 
wide area relays proposed in Section 3.6. The basic idea is to equip intelligent relays with 
real-time wide area information through appropriate communication channels. The input 
signals are for indicating the system vulnerability and relay reliability bias. They can come 
from real-time system monitoring, off-line analysis programs or simply from loading 
conditions and topology information. Within the adaptive relay, the decision-making module 
incorporates much more input signals than does a conventional relay to make more 
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intelligent protection decisions. In the examples here the author applies fuzzy set inference 
mechanism to the decision-making logic module. However, more possibilities of other 
implementation, such as multi-agent systems could also be explored. 
The procedure of implementing the algorithms in the following two examples is 
summarized as three steps: 
Step I. Creating and editing Fuzzy Inference Systems (FIS) in MATLAB's Fuzzy 
Logic Toolbox. This is the core of the proposed adaptive relay intelligence. 
Step2. Building the test transmission system in MATLAB's Power System Blockset, 
with the FIS module built in step 1 as the control mechanism of the adaptive relay. 
Step3. Testing the system behavior under different fault conditions in the block 
diagram simulation environment of Simulink. 
5.4.1 Implementation of Example 3 in Section 5.2.3 
The first example is to implement the adaptive relay logic in Example 3 in Section 
5.2.3. Consider a permanent fault on line 76-82(2) with a hidden failure on line 76-82(1) as 
shown in Fig. 5.2. Both circuits would trip leaving only line 76-82(3) in service. Then the 
conventional protection of line 76-82(3) may trip on overload or Zone 3 of the distance relay, 
resulting in system islanding. 
Previous research carried out by the author employed preventive protection setting 
change to avoid this catastrophe. If the relays are reset to allow a transient peak of 3.5 kA and 
a steady state current of 2.3 kA, the system will remain stable. However, although heavy load 
can be detected in advance and serves as the criterion of switching relay settings, relay 
unnecessary operations and hidden failures are not foreseeable. An ideally intelligent or 
adaptive protection system should be able to alter its behavior according to real-time data 
which reflect both power grid vulnerability and the situation of peer relays. A possible 
implementation of such an adaptive relay operating in emergency mode is illustrated in this 
example. 
In Fig. 5.10 the portion of interest in Fig. 5.2 is modeled in Simulink. The simplified 
power grid includes four buses (Busl as the equivalence of the system in the north, 76, 82, 
Bus4 as the equivalence of the system in the south), one source connected to Busl, one load 
connected to Bus4, and five transmission lines in between. The three parallel transmission 
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lines connecting bus 76 and 82, denoted as linel, line2 and line3, are the objects of study in 
this case. 
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Figure 5.10 Three parallel lines between bus 76 and 82 are modeled in Simulink 
The sequence of events starts with a fault on line2 at t = 2 cycles, with the fault signal 
shown in Fig. 5.11. The fault is cleared correctly by relays at both sides of line2, at t = 6 
cycles. In Fig. 5.12 the current through line2 is recorded, varying from the normal load of 0.9 
kA to the fault current of over 20 kA and ends up with zero. Assume the existence of a 
hidden failure on linel such that linel opens inadvertently at t = 6 cycle too as recorded in 
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Fig. 5.13. This situation resembles the initial event of many real-world disturbances, e.g. 
1996 WSCC voltage collapse. It leaves line3 with an unusual high post-fault current. Under 
normal circumstances, such a high current should have tripped line3. Fig. 5.14 exhibits the 
phenomenon of lines3 tripping by Zone 3 backup relay after 0.6 second time delay. Thus the 
whole north to south AC corridor is disconnected and the load current is interrupted. 
J Fault Signal Scope 
Figure 5.11 Fault occurs on line2 at t = 2 cycles 
Hne2_l Scope JSIJSJ 
Figure 5.12 Line2 current and relay signal: fault cleared at t = 6 cycle 
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Figure 5.13 Linel current and relay signal: relay trips incorrectly at t = 6 cycle 
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Figure 5.14 Line3 current with conventional distance relay: protection operation at t = 42 cycles 
However, for a stressed system with both heavy load and all alternative paths lost, 
line3 should be able to contribute to the system integrity by sustaining higher current for 
longer as long as the current itself does not exceed the thermal limit of the facilities. In this 
specific example the conductor of line3 is required to carry 2.3 kA of post-fault current, 
corresponding to 2 GVA of line load, which is below the stead-state thermal limit of 500kV 
transmission lines (Walker et al., 1982). Even for a more aggressive case when the post-fault 
current exceeds the conductor thermal limit, considering the thermal time constant9, there is 
still enough time for the adaptive protection to analyze the situation and initialize appropriate 
9 Conductor thermal time constant is the time for the conductor temperature to reach 63% of its final value. The 
value of thermal time constant is usually more than 10 minutes (IEEE 1993). 
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actions other than tripping line3, such as reclosing the unfaulted line2 to save the system 
from falling apart. Fig. 5.15 shows the implementation of line3 adaptive relay applying the 
fuzzy inference system (FIS) to make operation decisions. The decision-making module of 
the relay incorporates wide area information, such as system loading indices (variable name 
"Syslndex") and the percentage of parallel facilities lost (variable name "NumPrlTrp"), to 
evaluate the need of intentional overloading. By assigning proper membership functions to 
all input and output signals (Fig. 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, 5.20) and designing inference rules (Fig. 
5.19) according to system study, expertise or even common sense, the mechanism is able to 
make intelligent decisions within the order of millisecond (Fig. 5.21). 
Figure 5.15 Fuzzy Inference System of adaptive relay on line3 
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Figure 5.21 Inference procedure snapshot 
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The inference procedure snapshot in Fig. 5.21 shows the action of input signal 
fuzzification, aggregation and output defuzzification. While in Fig. 5.22 and 5.23 the 
variation of input and output are recorded over time. In Fig. 5.22, the uppermost yellow line 
reflects the condition of linel and line2 by showing the percentage of parallel facility tripped, 
which is critical topology information to the decision of line3. More topology data, both local 
and remote ones, can be incorporated in similar input signals via appropriate 
communications. The middle cyan line represents the confidence level of fault detection of 
the relay. This is a variable with a value between 0 and 1 instead of a firm digital value 0 or 1 
as in traditional relays because in real life many factors affect the assertion of the existence of 
a fault. Among these factors are fault type, fault location, relay condition etc. The purple 
slope represents the fluctuating system loading index. Comparing Fig. 5.22 to Fig. 5.23, it is 
clear to see the impact of all input signals on the decision of the adaptive relay. The relay 
does not trip at t = 42 cycles as the conventional relays would do because of relatively high 
system demand and high percentage of parallel facilities lost. 
Other combinations of input signals can be simulated and finely tuned according to 
experts' experience and operation requirements. The idea of this design is to show that relays 
can tune the operation bias continuously based on the level of system stress and vulnerability. 
The logic shown above adjusts the protection system behavior during a disturbance to avoid 
an otherwise catastrophic failure. 
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Figure 5.22 Input signals of the adaptive relay 
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Figure 5.23 Current through line 3 
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Figure 5.24 Load current not interrupted 
5.4.2 Implementation of Example 5 in Section 5.3.2 
A permanent fault between bus 83 and 86, as well as protective relay A through L are 
shown in Fig. 5.25 for this example. Normally circuit breakers A and B are supposed to clear 
both ends of the line within 4 cycles. When relay A has a defect such that breaker A at bus 83 
fails to open that end of the line, the traditional system will resort to a remote backup-
relaying scheme, resulting in disruption of the entire AC corridor and the system rapidly 
loosing synchronism. 
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Figure 5.25 The test system with breaker identities shown 
In this example it is assumed that all relays from A through L are adaptive ones 
instead of traditional distance relays. The simulation model built in Simulink is shown in Fig. 
5.26. Seven buses (bus 82, 86, 83, 114, 115, 119, 118) and 11 transmission lines are 
modeled, as well as a source and a load. With FIS (Fig. 5.27) built into the adaptive relay, 
rules in Fig. 5.28 are executed. All input signals from local and remote relays are fuzzified by 
membership functions similar to the one that is shown in Fig. 5.29. The inference procedure 
is captured in Fig. 5.30 through 5.32. 
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Figure 5.26 Simulink model of the test system 
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Figure 5.27 FIS properties 
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Figure 5.28 Rule view 
The principle of adaptive relaying is to share information among peer relays as well 
as among system monitoring and control devices. Consequently the decision-making 
procedure of relay A is not merely a function of relay A, but of the system indices and its 
peer relays, both in the same substation and in neighboring stations, or even remotely if 
necessary. The rules shown in Fig. 5.28 are more complicated than a simple voting scheme. 
It is to incorporate multiple input signals with different weighting factors assigned. In real­
time operation, the input signals from each relay are also functions of the fault detector 
measurement and the device condition of that relay. In the simulation, communication delays 
are considered random at the order of several cycles. This explains the dispersed arrival of 
input signals in Fig. 5.31. 
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The simulation results display that with more and more information arriving to 
contribute to the decision of relay A (in Fig. 5.31), the confidence level of breaker A to stay 
closed becomes less and less (in Fig. 5.32). Upon assessing the status of the entire system, 
the adaptive relay A would reach the conclusion that the fault is within its protection zone 
while the fault detector at A is malfunctioning. Fig. 5.33 displays the result that breaker A is 
forced to open after the FIS output is less than a certain threshold. With appropriate logic 
implemented in modern computation and communication technology, this intelligent decision 
process takes less time than a normal backup relay. Therefore the backup functions at other 
lines would not operate so the other lines remain undisrupted. 
In this section two examples of adaptive relay algorithm implementation are 
simulated in MATLAB and Simulink. They are simply to illustrate the proposed idea and 
validate the dynamic simulation of previous six examples. More realistic simulation would 
be needed if the prototype of an adaptive relay is being built. 
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CHAPTER 6. ADAPTIVE PROTECTION FOR MITIGATING 
It was wide area disturbances leading to system collapse, in particular voltage 
collapse, that have drawn significant attention to the possibility of a revolution in protection 
philosophy. In this chapter the historical disturbance data are firstly reviewed to find the 
interrelationship between protective systems and the voltage collapse incidents. Adaptive 
wide area protection scheme proposed in previous chapters is then applied to mitigate system 
voltage collapse. The protection design is briefly described and demonstrated through an 
application to the WECC 179-bus equivalent system. The system simulations with and 
without the proposed adaptive protection scheme are presented on a comparative basis. The 
results exhibit the effectiveness of adaptive wide area protection in preventing the system 
voltage collapse. The results are summarized and discussed at the end of the chapter. 
6.1 Analysis of Historical Data 
The security of a bulk power system is threatened when it is loaded to its maximum 
capacity. Voltage instability and incorrect protective relay operations are two major 
interrelated phenomena that occur when the system is under stress, as illustrated in Fig.5.1. 
As reported in many voltage collapse incidents (NERC, 2003), slow clearing of a fault may 
lead to excessive drop of the system voltage to a threshold value from which the system 
cannot recover itself. Low bus voltages during high loading conditions tend to trip protective 
relays to further aggravate the situation. Similar phenomenon can be observed with 
generators. The lack of reactive power during heavy loading conditions may trigger field 
limiters and overload protection to trip the generators. This undoubtedly contributes to the 
system collapse. 
VOLTAGE COLLAPSE 
C^Voltage instability^) 
Stressed system 
(Incorrect relay operatic^ 
Figure 6.1 Demonstration of the aggravation loop 
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Two aspects of the interrelationship between voltage stability and protection are 
observed by studying historical voltage collapse incidents (Begovic, et al., 1993; Begovic, et 
al., 2001; Alsberg, 1996): 
• Protection systems are mostly responsible in triggering voltage collapse. Table 5.1 
summarizes the initializing events in some severe voltage instability incidents. It 
shows how relay unnecessary operations lead to cascade voltage disturbances in a 
given system. 
• The occurrence of voltage instability poses additional challenges to protection 
systems. This is quite often for relays depending on measuring bus voltage. For 
example, the apparent impedance seen by low voltage buses with high load 
currents may fall into the protected zone of impedance relays and they may trip 
unnecessarily. This in turn may create unnecessary loss of system security 
Table 6.1 Examples of initializing events in voltage-related incidents 
1982 Belgium collapse started from six generators tripped by field limiter and overload protection 
(Begovic, et al., 1993). 
1983 Swedish network failure was initiated by a 220kV line overload protection operation 
(Begovic, et al., 1993). 
1987 Tennessee voltage collapse was caused by the slow clearing of a fault and the result of a 
voltage value low enough for cascading relay operations and stalled motors (Begovic, et al., 
1993). 
1989 Hydro Quebec disturbance was attributed to undesirable tripping of all SVCs on the HV 
network (Begovic, et al., 1993). 
07/1996 WSCC voltage collapse began with parallel transmission line sympathy tripping (Alsberg, 
1996). 
08/ 1996 WSCC voltage collapse involved a faulty relay, exciters overload and overloading of a tie 
(Begovic, et al., 2001). 
In order to have a quantitative understanding of the interrelationship between voltage 
stability and protection, historical data from NERC (2003) are summarized in Table 5.2. The 
goal is to identify the role of protection in voltage collapse and to examine the incorrect relay 
operations due to voltage collapses. All voltage-related disturbances are classified into the 
following two types according to their consequence and the time scale of evolution: 
• Emergency event, which causes load shedding and customer interruption without 
advance warning, including "Interruption" and "Unusual Occurrence" defined by 
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NERC (2003). From the protection point of view, emergency events have more 
value for further study. 
• Foreseeable event, which is more acceptable for customers, because either they 
receive adequate warning of the incident so they can respond appropriately, or 
customers reduce their respective load voluntarily. This type of event includes 
"Voltage Reduction", "Load Reduction/Demand Reduction", and "Public 
Appeal" again as defined by NERC. This category has little to do with protection 
therefore is ignored in later analysis. 
Table 6.2 Voltage related disturbances and protection 
Correct operation 9/30 30% 
Emergency event 
False tripping 12/30 40% 
Failure to trip 7/30 23% 
30/42 Not protection-related 2/30 7% 
42/213 (Voltage causing unnecessary operation) (7/30) (23%) 
Correct operation 2/12 17% 
Foreseeable event False tripping 0 
12/42 Failure to trip 0 
Not protection-related 10/12 83% 
As shown in Table 5.2, there were 42 voltage-related events among 213 NERC 
DAWG disturbances recorded from 1991 to 2000. From the protection point of view, the 
causes of these events are listed as "correct operation", "false tripping", "failure to trip" and 
"not protection-related". The study of these categories is to identify the role of protection in 
voltage disturbances. 
On the other hand, the phenomenon of an abnormal system voltage triggering relay 
unnecessary operation is included in the category of "voltage causing unnecessary 
operation". The study of this category is to expose the second aspect of the relationship 
between voltage stability and protection as described in the beginning of this section. 
Now examining the statistics given in Table 5.2, an obvious interrelationship between 
severe voltage disturbances and protection can be discerned by the high percentage of the 
following incidents: 
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• Incorrect relay operations contributing to emergency voltage-related large 
disturbances (63%)10. 
• Emergency voltage problems causing incorrect relay operations (23%). 
Therefore the concept of adaptive wide area protection, which is an effective way of 
eliminating unnecessary operations under stressed conditions, is proposed as a solution to 
mitigate voltage collapse incidents. 
6.2 Case Study 
With the intelligence and adaptiveness, relay schemes proposed in Chapter 3 would 
be able to apply possible protection countermeasures to mitigate wide area problems, in 
particular voltage collapse. In general, these actions include temporary generator 
overloading, more secure transmission protection and reactive support. 
In this section, the tuning of adaptive relays using real-time signals to yield secure 
system protection for a voltage collapse study is discussed. The purpose of maintaining 
transfer power and system stability is achieved by avoiding unnecessary relay operations. 
A voltage collapse incident with and without the proposed adaptive protection is 
simulated on a large test system. The steady state PV curves that are obtained from the 
simulation mimic the operating condition change during contingencies. 
6.2.1 Test System 
The system selected for this study is the same WECC 179-bus equivalent system used 
in Chapter 4. The one-line diagram is shown again in Fig. 5.2, with four 500 kV buses 
circled: bus 2, bus 32, bus 37 and bus 73. The study is focused on these buses that are 
considered to represent the wide area system behavior. The reasons of choosing these four 
buses are: 
• The voltage level of these four buses (500kV) reflect the bulk system voltage 
profile more accurately; 
10 This is the summation of" false tripping" (40%) and " failure to trip" (23%) of protection system. 
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These four buses are scattered geographically so the entire interconnected system 
profile is well represented; 
The voltage at these four buses is more sensitive to the system load increase and 
thus ideally suited for this study. Fig.5.3 shows voltage change ratio for each bus 
under a load increase from the base case to the collapsing critical point. 
NNfl: ; lirl'ls 
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Figure 6.2 One-line diagram of WECC 179-bus equivalent system, with 4 buses circled. 
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Figure 6.3 Percentage of voltage change for all buses from base case to critical point 
To simplify the case, it is assumed that 450 Mvar SVCs are installed at the load 
center of bus 2. In real world this can be an aggregation set of distributed SVCs installed on a 
number of buses in the vicinity. Under normal operating conditions, 436.4 Mvar of SVCs are 
switched in at the load level of 60,785.4 MW to provide proper voltage support. In the 
following subsections the performance of the relays at bus 2 for SVC protection is examined 
to study the effect of protection on voltage stability. 
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6.2.2 Simulated Incident 
The disturbance caused by geomagnetic storms during sunspot cycles is considered as 
a relay common mode failure in this study. Billinton and Allan (1992, p.353) gave the 
definition of a common mode failure as "an event having a single external cause with 
multiple failure effects which are not consequences of each other." A typical example would 
be one wide area disturbance, like a geomagnetic storm, causing more than one failures in 
protection systems. This situation is similar to the well-known March 13, 1989 outage that 
actually occurred in Hydro Quebec, in which hundreds of mis-operations of relays intended 
for SVC protection resulted in loss of power for the entire province (Kappenman & 
Albertson, 1990). It took only one-and-a-half minutes from the initial event to complete 
blackout (Kappenman, Zanetti, & Radasky, 1997). Such a short time frame of wide area 
disturbance has prohibited possible human operator intervention and forces the researchers to 
seek for improvements in protective relays (Chano et al., 1995). 
As a result of perturbations in the earth's magnetic field during geomagnetic storms, 
induced voltage gradients occur along the earth surface. The resulting earth-surface potentials 
(ESPs) are in turn impressed between any two neutral points of grounded wye-connected 
transformers at both ends of a line. The quasi dc geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) 
produced by the ESP drives into half-cycle saturation of the transformer core. The 
asymmetrical saturation creates harmonic distortion which could trip many protective relays 
unnecessarily. 
Therefore it is essential to take precautions to prevent or mitigate the effects of GICs 
on large interconnected power systems. However, the disturbance to the relays studied in this 
chapter is not restricted to GICs. In this study the incident is generalized as a common mode 
failure of relays leading to undesirable tripping of SVCs. Other triggering factors of similar 
common mode failures could be widespread harmonic distortion due to other reasons. 
6.2.3 Base Case: No Disturbance 
The PV curves of the test system are generated under the following assumptions: 
• All loads increase at the same percentage level at each bus at the original power 
factor; 
103 
• Similarly, the system load increase is picked up by all generators at equal 
percentage level; 
• The change in the system loss is picked by the slack bus. 
The Continuous Power Flow (CPF) program developed at Iowa State University 
(Ajjarapu & Christy, 1992) is utilized to generate the PV curves required for the study. The 
system load margin is found to be 65,410.83 MW. This case reflects the pre-contingency 
condition of the system. It serves as the base case for the study. The results for this case are 
shown in Fig.5.8 to 5.11 (labeled as "base case") on a comparative basis for other two cases 
to follow. 
6.2.4 Case 2: with Disturbance, Using Conventional Protection Scheme 
Conventional SVC protection is provided by thermal overload relays, overcurrent 
relays, overvoltage relays, unbalance relays etc., generally referred to as SVC relays in this 
document. These relays are susceptible to false tripping due to the high harmonic levels 
(Chano et al, 1995). Improvements have been suggested to protect SVCs under these 
abnormal conditions (Bozoki, et al., 1996). However, most of the current relay schemes are 
designed to have an operation bias towards dependability. Each relay operates based on its 
own fault detection and any of the redundant relays can trip the protected SVC. Therefore 
with a common mode failure of all SVC relays, many SVCs would be disconnected 
unnecessarily, as shown in Fig. 5.4. 
Due to the nature of the widespread disturbance, it is reasonable to assume that all 
SVC relays within the affected area initiate unnecessary tripping signals. Similar to the base 
case, the PV curves for the loss of SVCs are generated for this case using the CPF program. 
It is assumed that transient stability is maintained during the contingency. The simulation 
results show a much lower load margin of 60,964.99 MW compared to the base case. The PV 
curves of the four buses are shown in Fig. 5.8 through Fig. 5.11, labeled as "case 2". 
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Figure 6.4 Logic diagram for existing SVC protection. 
The dashed arrow in Fig. 5.8 shows the phenomenon of a voltage collapse. It 
indicates that there is no viable equilibrium point on the case 2 curve if the pre-contingency 
(base case) load level is between 60,964.99 MW and 65,410.83 MW. Thus conventional 
relay mis-operations contribute to voltage collapse. This is perhaps similar to what happened 
in Hydro Quebec in 1989 as identified in Table 5.1. 
6.2.5 Case 3: with Disturbance, Using Adaptive Wide Area Protection Scheme 
The effectiveness of the adaptive wide area protection to prevent voltage collapse is 
demonstrated here. The proposed protection scheme increases the load margin by adaptively 
and intelligently tuning the relays to a more secure status under highly stressed conditions. 
The possible implementation of the adaptive protection can be made either distributed 
at several substations, or centralized at the energy control center. 
The centralized decision-making architecture may adopt a hierarchical relay network. 
A large amount of relays at lower level have less authority for decision making thus need less 
intelligence. The high-level logic decision device in a control center has relay signals/breaker 
status of all circuits. It also monitors the system stress through various real-time/quasi real­
time vulnerability indices. This well-informed high level controller coordinates tripping 
decisions among all SVC relays. Consequently the analysis within the high level relay 
enables it to trip the most likely faulted SVC first, updating measurements, and then to trip 
the next most likely faulted one if fault detection sustains. Such a central control device is 
more likely to find out there is no real SVC fault and what the relays see are just harmonics. 
Thus fewer SVCs will be disconnected. 
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In this study, only the distributed approach at the substation level is implemented. 
That is, the operation decisions are made within each relay, rather than coordinated by a 
central controller. Each adaptive SVC relay is connected to a peer-to-peer network. Fault 
detection is realized in each relay the same way as it is in existing SVC relays. The result of 
processed detection is sent to the network for information sharing. Subsequently each relay 
gathers real-time input signals and all signals contribute to the final decision of a relay. 
The procedure is simulated using the MATLAB Power System Blockset and Fuzzy 
Logic Toolbox. In this study the author chose to apply a fuzzy inference mechanism for 
implementing the decision-making logic. However, other implementation schemes such as 
multiagent systems can also be explored. 
The decision-making module in each relay is represented as a Fuzzy Inference 
System (FIS) as shown in Fig.5.5. It incorporates various input signals, including 
conventional relay fault detection results, signals from its peer relays installed over a wide 
connected area, and the Voltage Stability Index (VSI) into the decision-making procedure. 
The VSI, calculated on-line, shows the distance of the system to the critical point. The VSI is 
available from CPF as the ratio of 
v 1 / 
d V j  
V. is the voltage of the weakest bus (Ajjarapu & Christy, 1992) 
where PT is the total system real power load and 
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Infcrcncc 
Rules 
Output: Bias of 
the relay 
operation 
Input 1: The 
percentage of 
peer SVCs 
tripped 
Input3 : Fault 
detection 
Input2: VSI 
Figure 6.5 Fuzzy Inference System diagram for an adaptive relay. 
Fig. 5.6 shows the membership functions of one of the adaptive relay input signals — 
the percentage of its peer SVCs disconnected. If this input signal is "bw", suggesting more 
SVCs are connected and working, this specific relay can afford to operate in a more 
dependable manner. However, when this input is "high", which means there are many SVCs 
over the wide area being tripped, the var support is insufficient. At this time stretching the 
106 
limit of this particular SVC to some extent might be a remedy for system integrity, while 
tripping one more SVC may severely threaten the system voltage stability. Thus the 
operation bias of this adaptive relay is tuned to security. This protection philosophy is 
beneficial in combating the situation of common mode relay failures. Similar membership 
functions of other input/output signals can be defined. 
ON 
m,*** I 
ml 
Figure 6.6 Membership functions of inputl: the percentage of peer SVCs disconnected. 
In each adaptive relay, all input signals are processed by membership functions. Then 
a series of weighted "if then" rules are applied for the inference procedure. The aggregated 
result is defuzzified to yield proper operating decisions. Thus the fuzzy inference mechanism 
can be able to make intelligent decisions within the order of milliseconds (Kezunovic, et al., 
1999). The snapshot of the procedure is captured in Fig. 5.7. 
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Figure 6.7 Inference procedure snapshot. 
In the simulation all adaptive relays make the decision of not tripping. It is because of 
the high percentage of peer relays detecting the same fault, and the stress of the entire 
system. In real world, data error due to communication delays or noisy measurements may 
cause some relays to trip. But at least fewer SVCs will be disconnected than in the 
conventional standalone setting. 
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It is reasonable and even conservative to assume that only some of the SVCs are 
tripped, e.g. 256 Mvar at the starting load level of 60,785.4 MW. That is 180.4 Mvar 
remained in the system. With this var support, the load margin is restored to 65,396.36 MW. 
Compared with the base case load margin at 65,410.83 MW, the system is not severely 
deteriorated by partially tripping the SVCs with adaptive relays. The PV curves for this case 
are also shown in Fig. 5.8 through Fig. 5.11, labeled as "case 3". The solid arrow in Fig. 5.8 
shows that the system settles down to a stable operating point after the disturbance. As long 
as the pre-contingency load level is less than 65,396.36 MW, the grid will be able to find a 
post-contingency stable operating point. That is, the system stays stable, assuming about one 
half of the relays in the adaptive SVC protection scheme operate as desired. 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the application of adaptive relays in 
combating voltage collapse. Therefore the relay design details are not elaborated. The details 
of the adaptive protection architecture, algorithms, intelligent inference procedure, and 
communication requirements are covered in previous chapters. 
6.2.6 Summary 
Table 5.3 summaries the simulation results of the three cases for bus 2. It is shown 
that at the same load level, reactive power support is different for the cases due to different 
size of SVCs connected. From this table it is clear that adopting the adaptive relay concept 
could have saved the system integrity and thus possibly avoids events similar to the 1989 
Hydro Quebec disturbance. 
Table 6.3 The load center of bus 2 and system characteristic at different cases 
P at bus 2 (MW) 0 at bus 2 (Mvar) Power factor at bus 2 Load margin (MW) 
Base case 1,750.0 -56.0 0.999488 leading 65410.83 
Case 2 1,750.0 380.4 0.97718 lagging 60,964.99 
Case 3 1,750.0 200.0 0.993533 lagging 65,396.36 
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6.3 Conclusions and Future Work 
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that the proposed adaptive protection 
can tune the bias continuously based on the level of system stress and vulnerability, as well 
as response from other peer relays. The logic described in chapter 3 adjusts the protection 
system behavior during a disturbance to avoid an otherwise catastrophic failure. 
The example study described in this chapter is intended to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the adaptive protection concept. Further work is needed in studying more 
complex voltage disturbance cases by using dynamic response curves rather than static 
curves as used in this study. Further, the proposed relay models should conform to the 
dynamic system performance. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONTRIBUTIONS 
Through post-mortem studies of catastrophic failures it is realized that improvement 
of protection philosophy is needed for wide area system protection. It is because current 
protection schemes may contribute to major blackouts due to the tendency of component 
protection sacrificing security for dependability. 
Adaptive protection based upon the latest technologies can combat emergencies 
involving faults that could otherwise lead to wide area disturbances. The concept is Êr from 
being well-accepted for the industry but it is consistent with the directions of technology 
development now underway. 
This research work identifies the importance of improvements in the system 
architecture for adaptive wide area protection development. Based on rapid-developing 
technologies, an open architecture, intelligent algorithms and communications for adaptive 
wide area protection are proposed. It is shown that adaptive protection is able to fulfill 
requirements of both dependability and security. The proposed protection system, which 
performs timely adaptive actions based on system-wide considerations, is intended to 
empower future power grids to withstand wide area catastrophes. The examples cited are 
intended to illustrate the concept. Further work is needed to nurture the concept before it can 
be implemented in the industry. It remains to determine additional situations where rapid 
emergency response of the protection system is effective and to determine what controls are 
useful in such cases. It also remains to study applications and to evaluate this concept in a 
specific, operational system. 
7.1 Major Contributions 
The main contributions of this research work are as follows: 
• Proposing a new concept on adaptive wide area protection for power systems 
• Designing the over-all architecture of adaptive wide area protection system 
» Demonstrating and validating the proposed adaptive wide area protection system 
architecture 
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Developing practical intelligent algorithms for the proposed adaptive wide area 
protection 
Demonstrating and validating the proposed intelligent adaptive protection 
algorithms 
Providing design criteria for intelligent communications that are suitable for 
adaptive wide area protection system 
Promoting the adoption and modification of UCA ™ 
Proposing the adoption of adaptive autoreclosure, in particular, single-phase 
tripping and reclosure in the practice of adaptive wide area protection 
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